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Abstract
We present a general framework for solving a large class of learning problems with non-linear
functions of classification rates. This includes problems where one wishes to optimize a non-
decomposable performance metric such as the F-measure or G-mean, and constrained training
problems where the classifier needs to satisfy non-linear rate constraints such as predictive parity
fairness, distribution divergences or churn ratios. We extend previous two-player game approaches
for constrained optimization to a game between three players to decouple the classifier rates from
the non-linear objective, and seek to find an equilibrium of the game. Our approach generalizes
many existing algorithms, and makes possible new algorithms with more flexibility and tighter
handling of non-linear rate constraints. We provide convergence guarantees for convex functions
of rates, and show how our methodology can be extended to handle sums of ratios of rates.
Experiments on different fairness tasks confirm the efficacy of our approach.
1 Introduction
In many real-world machine learning problems, the performance measures used to evaluate a
classification model are non-linear functions of the classifier’s prediction rates. Examples include the
F-measure, G-mean and H-mean used in class-imbalanced classification tasks [29, 25, 40, 41, 28],
metrics such as predictive parity used to impose specific fairness goals [7], the win-loss-ratio used
to measure classifier churn [15], and KL-divergence based metrics used in quantification tasks
[14, 17, 21]. Because these goals are non-linear and are non-continuous in the model parameters, it
becomes very challenging to optimize with them, especially when they are used in constraints [33].
Prior work on optimizing generalized rate metrics has largely focused on unconstrained learning
problems. These approaches fall under two broad categories: surrogate-based methods that replace
the classifier rates with convex relaxations [21, 20, 18, 22, 34], and oracle-based methods that
formulate multiple cost-sensitive learning tasks, and solve them using an oracle [38, 26, 35, 33, 43, 3].
Both these approaches have notable deficiencies. The first category of methods rely crucially on the
surrogates being close approximations to the rate metric, and perform poorly when this is not the
case (see e.g. experiments in [35]). The use of surrogates becomes particularly problematic with
constrained training problems, as relaxing the constraints with convex upper bounds can result in
solutions that are over-constrained or infeasible [8]. The second category of methods assume access
to a near-optimal cost-sensitive oracle, which is usually unrealistic in practice.
In this paper, we present a three-player game approach for learning problems where both the
objective and constraints can be defined by general functions of rates. The three players optimize
over model parameters, Lagrange multipliers and slack variables to produce a game equilibrium. Our
approach generalizes many existing algorithms (see Table 2), and makes possible new algorithms
with more flexibility and tighter handling of non-linear rate constraints. Specifically, we give a new
method (Algorithm 2) that can handle a wider range of performance metrics than previous surrogate
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methods (such as e.g. KL-divergence based metrics that only take inputs from a restricted range),
and can be applied to constrained training problems without the risk of over-constraining the model
because it needs to use surrogates less. To our knowledge, this is the first practical, surrogate-based
approach that can handle constraints on generalized rate metrics.
We show convergence of our algorithms for objectives and constraints that are convex functions of
rates. This result builds on previous work by Cotter et al. [8, 9] for handling linear rate constraints,
and additionally resolves an unanswered question in their work on the convergence of Lagrangian
optimizers for non-zero-sum games. We also extend our framework to develop heuristics for optimizing
performance measures that are a sum-of-ratios of rates (e.g. constraints on predictive parity and
F-measure), and demonstrate their utility on real-world tasks.
1.1 Related work
The problem of optimizing general functions of prediction rates was first addressed by Joachims (2005)
[20], who proposed a structural SVM based surrogate for common metrics. This method does not
however scale to large multiclass problems or to fairness problems with a large number of protected
groups, as its running time increases exponentially with the number of classes/groups. Following
this seminal work, there has been a series of alternate approaches, including plug-in methods that
tune a thresholds on estimates from a class probability oracle [44, 26, 36, 43], approaches that
break-down the learning problem into multiple cost-sensitive learning tasks and solve them using an
oracle [38, 35, 3], and stochastic optimization methods that optimize surrogate approximations to
the metric [22, 34, 21]. Our framework encompasses many of these methods as special cases.
One class of evaluation measure that has received much attention are fractional-linear functions
of rates [38, 26, 35, 5, 31], such as for example, the F-measure. Many of these works exploit the
pseudo-convex structure of the F-measure, but this property is absent for the problems that we
consider where we need to handle sums or differences of ratios. Pan et al. (2016) [37] provide a
heuristic approach for unconstrained sums of ratios, and recently Donini et al. (2018) [12] handle
constraints that are sums of ratios, but do so by solving a large number of linearly constrained
sub-problems, that grow exponentially with the number of rates. In contrast, we provide practical
algorithms that can handle both objectives and constraints that are sums of ratios of rates.
All the above methods solve unconstrained learning problems. When it comes to constrained
optimization, much of the focus has been on linear constraints on rates, e.g. to impose specific fairness
goals [18, 45]. Recent approaches handle linear rate constraints by computing an equilibrium of a
game between players who optimize model parameters θ and Lagrange multipliers λ [2, 23, 12, 8, 9].
Of these, the closest to us is Cotter et al. (2019) [8], who propose having only the θ-player optimize
a surrogate objective, and having the λ-player use the original rates. We adapt and build on this
idea to handle general functions of rates and provide theoretical guarantees for a simpler Lagrangian
algorithm than the one analyzed in Cotter et al.
2 Problem Setup and Contributions
Notations. For a continuous convex function h : Rn → R, we denote the domain of h by domh, a
sub-gradient of h at point z ∈ domh by ∇h(z) and the set of all sub-gradients of h at z by ∂h(z).
For a strictly convex function h, we will use ∇h(z) to denote the gradient of h at z.
Let X ⊆ Rd be an instance space and Y = {±1} be the label space. Let fθ : X → R be a
prediction model, parameterized by θ ∈ Θ. Given a model fθ and some distribution D over X × Y,
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Table 1: Examples of generalized rate metrics. These may arise either as the objective or as
constraints. Each ψ is either convex (C), pseudo-convex (PC) or a sum or difference of ratios (SR).
KLD is the KL-divergence between the true proportion of positives p = P(Y = 1) and the predicted
proportion of positives pˆ. wins denotes the fraction of examples where the new model makes correct
predictions, among all examples where it disagrees with the old model. losses refers to the fraction
of examples where the new model makes incorrect predictions, among all examples where it disagrees
with the old model. A and B refer to different protected groups or slices of the population.
Measure Definition ψ Type
G-mean [27, 10] 1−√TPR× TNR 1−√z1 z2 C
H-mean [24] 1− 21/TPR+1/TNR 1− 21/z1+1/z2 C
Q-mean [28] 1−
√
FPR2 + FNR2 1−
√
z21 + z
2
2 C
KL-divergence [14, 17] p log(ppˆ) + p log(
1−p
1−pˆ) p log(
p
z1
) + p log(1−pz2 ) C
F-measure [32] 1− 2TP2TP+FP+FN 1− 2z12z1+z2+z3 PC
Predictive parity [7] TPATPA+FNA −
TPB
TPB+FNB
z1
z1+z2
− z3z3+z4 SR
F-measure parity 2TPA2TPA+FPA+FNA −
2TPB
2TPB+FPB+FNB
2z1
2z1+z2+z3
− 2z42z4+z5+z6 SR
Churn difference [15] winsAlossesA −
winsB
lossesB
z1
z2
− z3z4 SR
we define the classifier’s rate on D as:
R(θ;D) = E(X,Y )∼D
[
I
{
Y = sign(fθ(X))
}]
.
For example, if DA denotes the distribution over a sub-population A ⊆ X, then R(θ;DA) gives
us the accuracy of fθ on this sub-population. If D+ denotes a conditional distribution over the
positively-labeled examples, then R(θ;D+) is the true-positive rate TPR(θ) of fθ and 1−R(θ;D+)
is the false-negative rate FNR(θ) of fθ. Similarly, if D− denotes a conditional distribution over
the negatively-labeled examples, then TNR(θ) = R(θ;D−) is the true-negative rate of fθ, and
FPR(θ) = 1−R(θ;D−) is the false-positive rate of fθ. Further, the true-positive and false-positive
proportions are given by TP(θ) = pTPR(θ) and FP(θ) = (1− p)FPR(θ), where p = P(Y = 1);
we can similarly define the true negative proportion TN and false negative proportion FN.
We will consider several distributions D1, . . . , DK over X ×Y , and use the short-hand Rk(θ) to de-
note the rate function R(θ;Dk). We will denote a vector of K rates as: R(θ) = [R1(θ), . . . , RK(θ)]>.
We assume we have access to unbiased estimates of the rates Rˆk(θ) = 1n
∑n
i=1 I
{
yki = sign(fθ(x
k
i ))
}
,
computed, for example, from samples S = {(xk1, yk1 ), . . . , (xknk , yknk)} ∼ Dk.
We will also consider stochastic models which are defined by distributions over the model
parameters Θ. Let ∆Θ denote the set of all such distributions over Θ, where for any µ ∈ ∆Θ, µ(θ) is
the probability mass on model θ. We define the rate Rk for a stochastic model µ to be the expected
value for random draw of a model from µ, so Rk(µ) = Eθ∼µ [Rk(θ)].
2.1 Generalized Rate Metrics as Objective
In many real-world applications the performance of a model is evaluated by a function of multiple
rates: ψ (R1(θ), . . . , RK(θ)) for some ψ : RK+ → R. For example, a common evaluation metric used
in class-imbalanced classification tasks is the G-mean: GM(θ) = 1 − √TPR(θ)TNR(θ), which is
a convex function of rates [27, 10]. Similarly, a popular evaluation metric used in text retrieval is
the F-measure: F1(θ) =
2TP(θ)
2TP(θ) +FP(θ) +FN(θ) , which is a fractional-linear or pseudo-convex function
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of rates [30]. See Table 1 for more examples of evaluation metrics. In the last several years, there
has been much interest in directly optimizing performance measures of this form during training
[22, 34, 38, 26, 35, 21, 36]:1
min
θ∈Θ
ψ (R1(θ), . . . , RK(θ)) . (P1)
2.2 Generalized Rate Metrics as Constraints
There are also many applications, where one wishes to impose constraints defined by non-linear
function of rates, for example to ensure group-specific fairness metrics. Examples include:
• Predictive parity fairness: Fair classification tasks where one wishes to match the precision
of a model across different protected groups:
∣∣∣ TPA(θ)TPA(θ) +FPA(θ) − TPB(θ)TPB(θ) +FPB(θ) ∣∣∣ ≤  [7]. One
may also want to match e.g. the F-measure of a model across different groups.
• Distribution matching : Fairness or quantification tasks where one wishes to match the distri-
bution of a model’s outputs across different protected groups [17, 21]. One way to achieve this
is to constrain the KL-divergence between the overall class proportion p and proportion of
predicted positives for each group pˆA, i.e. KLD(p, pˆA) ≤ , where KLD is convex in pˆA [33].
• Churn: Problems where one wishes to replace a legacy model with a more accurate model while
limiting the changed predictions between the new and old models (possibly across different
slices of the user base). This is ideally framed as constraints on the win-loss ratio’s [9], which
can be expressed as ratios of rates [15].
These and related problems can be framed generally as:
min
θ∈Θ
g(θ) s.t. φj (R1(θ), . . . , RK(θ)) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ [J ], (P2)
for some objective function g : Θ→ R, and J constraint functions φj : RK+ → R.
2.3 Limitations with Existing Surrogate-based Methods
Existing methods for solving (P1) either assume access to an idealized oracle that can optimize a linear
combination of the rates R1, . . . , RK [38, 26, 35, 43, 3], or resort to optimizing a convex relaxation
to the performance metric [34, 21]. The latter class of methods enjoy convergence guarantees under
more realistic assumptions, and proceed by replacing the rates Rk with continuous and differentiable
surrogate functions R˜k : Θ→ R+, so that the resulting objective ψ
(
R˜1(θ), . . . , R˜K(θ)
)
is a convex
(or pseudo-convex) upper-bound on ψ (R1(θ), . . . , RK(θ)). However, finding such global convex
relaxations to (P1) may not be possible for many common performance metrics.
For example, if ψ is convex but monotonically decreasing in Rk, then one would need to replace
Rk with a surrogate R˜k that is concave in θ and lower bounds Rk: Rk(θ) ≥ R˜k(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ. This can
be problematic for metrics such as the G-mean ψ(z, z′) = 1−√z1z2, where any non-trivial concave
surrogates that lower bounds the TPR and TNR will necessarily evaluate to negative values for
some θ’s, rendering the square root undefined. A similar issue arises with the KLD and F-measure
metrics (see Appendix D for details). While one can still apply existing surrogate methods to these
1The performance measures we consider are specified by functions ψ that are defined over the non-negative orthant.
This covers all the metrics listed in Table 1, including the KL-divergence metric, which can be seen as a function
ψ(z1, z2) = p log
(
p
z1
)
+ p log
(
1−p
z2
)
of two rates R1(θ) = pˆ(θ) and R2(θ) = 1− pˆ(θ).
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metrics by restricting the model space Θ to only those θ’s for which the surrogates are non-negative,
this severely limits the class of models for which these methods are guaranteed to converge.
Surrogate relaxations pose further complications when used to approximate constraints (P2),
where we run the risk of over-constraining the model space, and making the problem infeasible.
2.4 Our Contributions
In light of the above issues, we seek to develop practical algorithms with provable convergence
guarantees without having to make unrealistic assumptions (such as access to an oracle) or placing
undue restrictions on the model space, while performing at least as well as existing methods in
practice. We make the following contributions.
• We present a general template for solving (P1) and (P2) by introducing slack variables to
decouple the rates from the “non-linear” portion of the problem, and formulating a max-min
game between players who optimize over the model parameters, the slack variables and auxiliary
Lagrange multipliers (see Section 3.1). By plugging in different no-regret strategies for the three
players, one can recover many existing approaches and design new oracle-based algorithms
(Algorithm 1) and improved surrogate-based algorithms (Algorithm 2).
• One of the main advantages of our framework is that it allows the different players to work
with different relaxations to the max-min objective, as long as the player strategies lead to
an equilibrium of the game. In particular, the proposed surrogate-based algorithms only use
surrogates for optimizing over the model parameters, and use the original rate values for all
other updates. As a result, they enjoy provable convergence guarantees for metrics such as the
G-mean and KLD even when the surrogates evaluate to non-positive values, and allow for a
tighter handling of the non-linear rate constraints.
• We provide convergence guarantees for convex functions of rates. Our main results are for the
proposed surrogate-based algorithms: we show a O˜
(
1/
√
T
)
convergence bound for (P1) and
a O˜
(
1/T 1/4
)
bound for (P2). For the first result, we measure the performance of the learned
classifier using original rates and that of the comparator using the surrogate rates (see Section
3.3). For the second result, despite the mismatch in player objectives, we show that the learned
classifier is near-feasible on constraints defined by the original rates (see Section 4.1).
• As a corollary, we resolve an unanswered question in Cotter et al. (2019) [8]. Cotter et al. propose
a version of our surrogate-based algorithm for linear rate constraints, but leave its convergence
properties unanswered. Our result provides a convergence bound for a generalization of their
algorithm.
• We extend our framework to handle constraints that are a sum of ratios of rates and provide
two heuristic algorithms (see Section 4.2). The first algorithm directly optimizes ratios of slack
variables (Algorithm 3), and the second is based on a biconvex formulation [37] (Algorithm 4).
• Finally, we conduct experiments on two constrained learning tasks with several benchmark and
real-world fairness datasets. In the first task, we present cases where our new surrogate-based
algorithm often yields significant improvements over an existing surrogate-based approach.
In the second task, we show that the proposed algorithms are better at optimizing objec-
tives/constraints with sum-of-ratios of rates compared to existing baselines.
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Table 2: Algorithms for (P1)–(P3) as three-player games. Frank-Wolfe [35], SPADE [34], NEMSIS
[21] are previous algorithms. Alg. 1–3 are the proposed methods. Each player can do Best Response
(BR), Online Gradient Descent (OGD) or Follow-The-Leader (FTL), and the game is zero-sum (ZS)
or not. The first five algorithms find an approximate Nash or Coarse-Correlated (C.C.) equilibrium.
Alg. 3 seeks to handle constraints that are sum-of-ratios of rates (P3) (see Section 4.2); because the
constraints are non-convex in the rates, it is not guaranteed to find an equilibrium.
Player Objective Player Strategy
Alg. Prob. ξ λ θ ξ λ θ ZS Equil.
F-W P1 -
(
min
ξ
L1(ξ; ·)
)
+ L2(θ; ·) L2 - FTL BR 3 Nash
SPADE P1 L1 L1 + L˜2 L˜2 BR OGD OGD 3 Nash
NEMSIS P1 -
(
min
ξ
L1(ξ; ·)
)
+ L˜2(θ; ·) L˜2 - FTL OGD 3 Nash
Alg. 1 P1, P2 L1 L1 + L2 L2 BR OGD BR 3 Nash
Alg. 2 P1, P2 L1 L1 + L2 L˜2 BR OGD OGD 7 C. C.
Alg. 3 P3 L1 L1 + L2 L˜2 OGD OGD OGD 7 -
We note that all our game formulations can be equivalently regarded as two-player games where
one player is in-charge of the parameters that need to be minimized, and the other player in-charge
the parameters that need to be maximized. We will however use the three-player viewpoint in the
text as we find it to be a useful way to think about the problem algorithmically in that the three
sets of optimization parameters can use different algorithms (see Table 2).
3 Generalized Rate Metric Objective
In this section, we present algorithms for solving the first problem we presented above (P1), which is
to optimize a generalized rate metric without constraints. We assume ψ is strictly jointly convex,
monotonic, and L-Lispchitz w.r.t. the `∞-norm in [0, 1]K . For ease of exposition, we assume that ψ
is monotonically increasing in all arguments, although our approach easily extends to metrics that
are monotonically increasing in some arguments and monotonically decreasing in others.
3.1 Three-player Game Formulation
We equivalently re-write (P1) to de-couple the rates Rk from the non-linear function ψ by introducing
auxiliary variables ξ1, . . . , ξK :
min
θ∈Θ, ξ∈RK+
ψ (ξ1, . . . , ξK) s.t. Rk(θ) ≤ ξk, ∀k ∈ [K]. (1)
A standard approach for solving (1) is to write the Lagrangian for the problem with Lagrange
multipliers λ1, . . . , λK ∈ R+ for the K constraints:
L(θ, ξ;λ)
= ψ (ξ1, . . . , ξK) +
K∑
k=1
λk (Rk(θ) − ξk) = ψ(ξ1, . . . , ξK) −
K∑
k=1
λkξk︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1(ξ;λ)
+
K∑
k=1
λk Rk(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2(θ;λ)
.
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Then one maximizes the Lagrangian over λ ∈ RK+ , and minimizes it over θ ∈ Θ and ξ ∈ RK+ :
max
λ∈RK+
min
θ∈Θ
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λ) + L2(θ;λ), (2)
Notice that L1 is convex in ξ (by convexity of ψ), while L1 and L2 are linear in λ. We pose this
max-min problem as a zero-sum game between three players: a player who minimizes L1 + L2 over
θ, a player who minimizes L1 + L2 over ξ, and a player who maximizes L1 + L2 over λ. Each of
the three players can now use different optimization algorithms customized for their problem. If
additionally the Lagrangian was convex in θ, one could solve for an equilibrium of this game and
obtain a solution for the primal problem (1). However, since L2 is a weighted sum of rates Rk(θ), it
need not be convex (or even continuous) in θ.
To overcome this difficulty, we expand the solution space from deterministic models Θ to stochastic
models ∆Θ [2, 8, 9], and re-formulate (2) as a problem that is linear in µ, by replacing each Rk(θ)
with Eθ∼µ[Rk(θ)] in L2:
max
λ∈Λ
min
µ∈∆Θ
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λ) + L2(µ;λ). (3)
Here for technical reasons, we restrict the Lagrange multipliers to a bounded set Λ = {λ ∈
R+ | ‖λ‖1 ≤ κ}, we will choose the radius κ > 0 later in our theoretical analysis. By solving for
an equilibrium of this expanded max-min problem, we can find a stochastic model µ ∈ ∆θ that
minimizes ψ(R1(µ), . . . , RK(µ)).
There are two approaches that we can take to find an equilibrium of the expanded game. The
first approach is to assume access to an oracle that can perform the the minimization of L2 over µ
for a fixed λ and ξ. Since this is a linear optimization over the simplex, this amounts to performing a
minimization over deterministic models in Θ. The second and more realistic approach is to work with
surrogates for the rates that are continuous and differentiable in θ. Let R˜1, . . . , R˜K : Θ→ R+ be
differentiable convex surrogate functions that are upper bounds on the rates: Rk(θ) ≤ R˜k(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ.
We assume access to (unbiased) stochastic sub-gradients for the surrogates, i.e. for any θ ∈ Θ,
we have access to a noisy sub-gradient ∇θR˜k(θ) with E[∇θR˜k(θ)] ∈ ∂θR˜k(θ). We then define a
surrogate-based approximation for L2:
L˜2(θ;λ) =
∑K
k=1 λk R˜k(θ). (4)
All we need to do now is to choose the objective that each player seeks to optimize (true or
surrogate [8]) and the strategy that they use to optimize their objective, so that the players converge
to an equilibrium of the game. Each of these choices lead to a different algorithm for (approximately)
solving (P1). Table 2 summarizes different choices of strategies and objectives for the players, and
the type of equilibrium and the algorithm that results from these choices. As we shall see shortly (and
also elaborate in Appendix B), many existing algorithms can be seen as instances of this template.
3.2 Oracle-based Lagrangian Optimizer
As a warm-up illustration of our approach, we first describe an idealized algorithm assuming access to
an oracle that can approximately optimize L2 over Θ (this oracle essentially optimizes a weighted-sum
of rates, i.e. a cost-sensitive error objective [13]):
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Algorithm 1 Oracle-based Optimizer
Initialize: λ0
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
if (P1) then
ξt = ∇ψ∗(λt)
else if (P2) then
Construct Φ : ξ 7→∑Jj=1 λtj ξk
ξt = ∇Φ∗(λtJ+1, . . . , λtJ+K)
end if
θt ∈ argminθ∈Θ L2(θ;λt) [CSO]
λt+1 = ΠΛ
(
λt + η∇λ L(θt, ξt; λt)
)
end for
return θ1, . . . , θT
Algorithm 2 Surrogate-based Optimizer
Initialize: θ0, λ0
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
if (P1) then
ξt = ∇ψ∗(λt)
else if (P2) then
Construct Φ : ξ 7→∑Jj=1 λtj ξk
ξt = ∇Φ∗(λtJ+1, . . . , λtJ+K)
end if
θt+1 ← ΠΘ(θt − ηθ∇θ L˜2(θt; λt))
λt+1 ← ΠΛ(λt + ηλ∇λ L(θt, ξt; λt))
end for
return θ1, . . . , θT
Figure 1: Optimizers for the unconstrained problem (P1) and constrained problem (P2). Here ΠΛ
denotes the `1-projection onto Λ and ΠΘ denotes the `2-projection onto Θ. We denote a (stochastic)
gradient of L by ∇λL(θt, ξt;λt) =
∑K
k=1(Rˆk(θ
t) − ξtk), where Rˆk(θt) is an unbiased estimate of
Rk(θ
t). We denote a (stochastic) sub-gradient of L˜2 by ∇θL˜2(θt;λt) =
∑K
k=1 λk∇θR˜k(θt)), where
∇θR˜k(θt) is an unbiased gradient estimate for R˜k(θt), i.e. E[∇θR˜k(θt)] ∈ ∂θR˜k(θt), ∀k ∈ [K].
Definition 1. A ρ-approximate cost-sensitive optimization (CSO) oracle takes λ as input and outputs
a model θ∗ ∈ Θ such that L2(θ∗;λ) ≤ minθ∈Θ L2(θ;λ) + ρ.2
We have all three players optimize the true Lagrangians, with the θ-player and ξ-player playing
best responses to the opponents strategies, i.e. they perform full optimization over their parameter
space, and the λ-player running online gradient descent (OGD), an algorithm with no-regret
guarantees [46]. The θ-player performs best response by using the above oracle to approximately
minimize L2 over θ. For the ξ-player, the best response optimization can be computed in closed-form:
Lemma 1. Let ψ∗ : RK+ → R denote the Fenchel conjugate of ψ. Then for any λ s.t. ‖λ‖1 ≤ L:
∇ψ∗(λ) ∈ argmin
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λ).
. The resulting algorithm outlined in Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to find an approximate Nash
equilibrium of the max-min game in (3), and yields an approximate solution to (P1):
Theorem 1. Let θ1, . . . , θT be the iterates generated by Algorithm 1 for (P1), and let µ¯ be a
stochastic model with a probability mass of 1T on θ
t. Define Bλ ≥ maxt ‖∇λL(ξt, θt;λt)‖2. Then
setting κ = L and η = L
Bλ
√
2T
, we have w.p. ≥ 1− δ over draws of stochastic gradients:
ψ (R(µ¯)) ≤ min
µ∈∆Θ
ψ (R(µ)) + O
(√
log(1/δ)
T
)
+ ρ.
2An example of a cost-sensitive oracle is a procedure that minimizes the empirical cost-sensitive error on a
training sample S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} over the space of models Θ. Using standard results, one can show
that for any λ, with probability ≥ 1 − δ (over draw of S), the empirical error minimizer θ∗ satisfies L2(θ∗;λ) ≤
minθ∈Θ L2(θ;λ) + O
(√ log(δ)
n
)
. While in Definition 1, we assume a deterministic guarantee on the cost-sensitive
oracle, all our results easily extend to the case where the guarantee on the oracle holds with high probability.
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Table 3: Convergence guarantees for algorithms for (P1). Frank-Wolfe [35], SPADE [34], NEMSIS
[21] are previous algorithms. Algorithms require ψ to be smooth or not; apply either to a general
convex model class Θ or to only a restricted subset of models for which the surrogates evaluate to
values within the domain of ψ; may need access to a cost-sensitive oracle or not; output either a
stochastic classifier µ¯ or a deterministic classifier θ¯. The bounds are on the optimality gap.
Alg. Smooth? Restr. Θ? Oracle? Opt. Gap Opt. Bound
F-W 3 7 3 ψ (R(µ¯)) − min
µ∈∆Θ
ψ (R(µ)) O˜ ( 1T + ρ)
SPADE 7 3 7 ψ
(
R˜(θ¯)
) − min
θ∈Θ
ψ
(
R˜(θ)
) O˜(√ 1T )
NEMSIS 3 3 7 ψ
(
R˜(θ¯)
) − min
θ∈Θ
ψ
(
R˜(θ)
) O˜(√ 1T )
Alg. 1 7 7 3 ψ (R(µ¯)) − min
µ∈∆Θ
ψ (R(µ)) O˜
(√
1
T
)
+ ρ
Alg. 2 7 7 7 ψ
(
R(µ¯)
) − min
θ∈Θ˜
ψ
(
R˜(θ)
) O˜(√ 1T )
See Appendix F for the proof.
Remark 1 (Frank-Wolfe: a special case). A previously proposed oracle-based algorithm for
optimizing convex functions of rates is the Frank-Wolfe based approach of Narasimhan et al. (2015)
[34]. Interestingly, this method can be recovered from our framework by reformulating λ-player’s
objective to include the minimization over ξ: LFW(λ, θ) = minξ L1(ξ;λ) + L2(θ;λ) and having the
λ-player play the Follow-The-Leader (FTL) algorithm [1] to maximize this objective. As before, the
θ-player plays best response on L2 using the CSO oracle. See Table 3 and Appendix B for details.
3.3 Surrogate-based Lagrangian Optimizer
While the CSO oracle may be available in some special cases (e.g. when Θ is finite or when the
underlying conditional-class probabilities can be estimated accurately), in many practical scenarios,
it is not realistic to assume access to an oracle that can optimize non-continuous rates. We now
provide a more practical algorithm for solving (P1) where the θ-player optimizes the surrogate
Lagrangian function L˜2 in (4) instead of L2 and uses stochastic gradients ∇θ L˜2(θ;λ). The ξ- and
λ-players, however, continue to operate on the true Lagrangian functions L1 and L2, which are
continuous in the parameters ξ and λ that these players optimize.
In our proposed approach, outlined in Algorithm 2, both the θ-player and λ-player now run
online gradient descent algorithms, while the ξ-player plays its best response at each iteration. Since
it is the θ-player alone who optimizes a surrogate, the resulting game between the three players is
no longer zero-sum. Yet, we are able to show that the player strategies converge to an approximate
coarse-correlated (C. C.) equilibrium of the game, and yields an approximate solution to (P1).
Theorem 2. Let θ1, . . . , θT be the iterates of Algorithm 2 for (P1), and let µ¯ be a stochastic
model with probability 1T on θ
t. Let Θ˜ =
{
θ ∈ Θ | R˜(θ) ∈ domψ}. Let BΘ ≥ maxθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2,
Bθ ≥ maxt ‖∇θL˜2(θt;λt)‖2 and Bλ ≥ maxt ‖∇λL(ξt, θt;λt)‖2. Then setting κ = L, ηθ = BΘBθ√T
and ηλ = LBλ
√
2T
, we have w.p. ≥ 1− δ over draws of stochastic gradients:
ψ
(
R(µ¯)
) ≤ min
θ∈Θ˜
ψ
(
R˜(θ)
)
+ O
(√
log(1/δ)
T
)
.
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See Appendix G for the proof. Note the right-hand side contains the optimal value for the
surrogate objective ψ(R˜(·)) and not for the original performance metric. This is unsurprising given
the θ-player’s inability to work with the true rates. Also, while Algorithm 2 can be applied to
optimize over a general (bounded) convex model class Θ, the comparator for our guarantee is a
subset of models Θ˜ ⊆ Θ for which ψ(R˜(θ)) is defined. This is needed as the surrogate R˜(θ) may
output values outside the domain of ψ.
Remark 2 (SPADE, NEMSIS: special cases of our approach). Our approach includes two
previous surrogate-based algorithms as special cases: SPADE [35] and NEMSIS [21]. SPADE can
be recovered from our framework by having the same player strategies as Algorithm 2 but with both
the θ- and λ-players optimizing surrogate objectives, i.e. with the θ-player minimizing L˜2 and the
λ-player maximizing L1 + L˜2. NEMSIS also uses surrogates for both the θ and λ updates. It can be
recovered by having the θ-player run OGD on L˜2, and having the λ-player play FTL over λ on the
combined objective L˜NEM(θ, λ) = minξ L1(ξ;λ) + L˜2(θ;λ). See Table 3 and Appendix B for details.
Remark 3 (Application to wider range of metrics). As noted in Section 2.3, because of their
strong reliance on surrogates, SPADE and NEMSIS cannot be applied directly to functions ψ that
take inputs from a restricted range (e.g. KL-divergence), unless the surrogates are also bounded in the
same range. In Appendix D, we point out scenarios where the NEMSIS method [21] fails to optimize
the KL-divergence metric, unless the model is sufficiently regularized to not output large negative
values. Algorithm 2 has no such restriction and can be applied even if the outputs of the surrogates
are not within the domain of ψ. This is because it it uses the original rates for updates on λ. As a
result, the game play between ξ and λ never produces values that are outside the domain of ψ.
4 Generalized Rate Metric Constraints
In this section, we describe how to apply our approach to the constrained optimization problem
in (P2). We consider two cases: the constraint functions φj ’s are (1) convex in the rates, and (2)
summation of ratios in the rates.
4.1 Case of Convex φ
We start with the case where the φj ’s are strictly jointly convex, monotonic in each argument and
L-Lipschitz w.r.t. the `∞-norm in [0, 1]K , and g is a bounded convex function. For convenience, we
assume that the φj ’s are monotonically increasing in all arguments. Constraints on the KL-divergence
and G-mean metrics are examples of this setting.
We introduce a set auxiliary variables ξ1, . . . , ξK for the K rate functions and re-write (P2) as:
min
θ∈Θ, ξ∈RK+
g(θ)
s.t. φj (ξ1, . . . , ξK) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ [J ] (5)
Rk(θ) ≤ ξk, ∀k ∈ [K]. (6)
The Lagrangian for the re-written problem is given below, where λ1, . . . , λJ ∈ R+ and λJ+1, . . . , λJ+K ∈
R+ are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints in (5) and (6) respectively:
L(θ, ξ;λ) =
J∑
j=1
λj φ
j(ξ1, . . . , ξK) −
K∑
k=1
λJ+k ξk︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1(ξ;λ)
+ g(θ) +
K∑
k=1
λJ+k Rk(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2(θ;λ)
. (7)
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As before, we expand the search space to include stochastic models in ∆Θ, restrict the Lagrange
multipliers to a bounded set Λ =
{
λ ∈ RJ+K+
∣∣ ‖λ‖1 ≤ κ}, and formulate a max-min problem:
max
λ∈Λ
min
µ∈∆Θ, ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λ) + L2(µ;λ). (8)
One can now apply Algorithm 1 and 2 to this problem. For Algorithm 1, the θ-player uses the
CSO oracle to optimize L2, and for Algorithm 2, the θ-player uses OGD to optimize a surrogate
Lagrangian L˜2(µ;λ) =
∑K
k=1 λJ+k R˜k(µ). The best response strategy for the ξ-player is given by:
Lemma 2. Let Φ(ξ) =
∑J
j=1 λj φ
j(ξ) with λj > 0 for some j ∈ [J ]. Let Φ∗ : RK+ → R+ denote the
Fenchel conjugate of Φ. Then:
∇Φ∗(λJ+1, . . . , λJ+K) ∈ argmin
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λ).
Theorem 3. Let θ1, . . . , θT be the iterates generated by Algorithm 1 for (P2), and let µ¯ be a
stochastic model with a probability mass of 1T on θ
t. Suppose there exists a µ′ ∈ ∆Θ such that
φj(R(µ′)) ≤ −γ, ∀j ∈ [J ], for some γ > 0. Let Bg = maxθ∈Θ g(θ). Let µ∗ ∈ ∆Θ be such that µ∗
is feasible, i.e. φj(R(µ∗)) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ [J ], and Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] ≤ Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] for every µ ∈ ∆Θ that is
feasible. Let Bλ ≥ maxt ‖∇λL(ξt, θt;λt)‖2. Then setting κ = 2(L+1)Bgγ and η = κBλ√2T , we have
w.p. ≥ 1− δ over draws of stochastic gradients:
Eθ∼µ¯ [g(θ)] ≤ Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] +O
(√
log(1/δ)
T
+ ρ
)
and φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ O
(√
log(1/δ)
T
+ ρ
)
, ∀j ∈ [J ].
See Appendix H for the proof. We have thus shown that Algorithm 1 outputs a stochastic model
that has an objective close to the optimal feasible solution for (P2), while also closely satisfying the
constraints. We next present a convergence result for Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4. Let θ1, . . . , θT be the iterates of Algorithm 1 for (P2), and let µ¯ be a stochastic model
with probability 1T on θ
t. Let Θ˜ =
{
θ ∈ Θ | ∀j, R˜(θ) ∈ domφj , ∀j}. Let θ˜∗ ∈ Θ˜ be such that
it satisfies the surrogate-relaxed constraints φj(R˜(θ˜∗)) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ [J ], and g(θ˜∗) ≤ g(θ) for every
θ ∈ Θ˜ that satisfies the same constraints. Let BΘ ≥ maxθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2, Bθ ≥ maxt ‖∇θL˜2(θt;λt)‖2 and
Bλ ≥ maxt ‖∇λL(ξt, θt;λt)‖2. Then setting κ = (L + 1)Tω for ω ∈ (0, 0.5), ηθ = BΘBθ√2T and
ηλ =
κ
Bλ
√
2T
, we have w.p. ≥ 1− δ over draws of stochastic gradients:
Eθ∼µ¯ [g(θ)] ≤ g(θ˜∗) + O
(√
log(1/δ)
T 1/2−ω
)
and φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ O
(√
log(1/δ)
Tω
)
, ∀j ∈ [J ].
See Appendix I for the proof. The proof is an adaptation of the equilibrium analysis in Agarwal
et al. (2018) [2] to non-zero-sum games. We point out that despite the θ-player optimizing surrogate
functions, the final stochastic classifier is near-feasible for the original rate metrics. We also note that
this result holds even if the surrogates output values outside the domain of the constraint functions
φj ’s (e.g. with KL-divergence based constraints).
While the above convergence rate is not as good as the standard O(1/√T ) rate achievable for
OGD, this is similar to the guarantees shown by e.g. Agarwal et al. [2] for a linear rate-constrained
optimization problem.3 The reason for the poorer convergence rate is that we are unable to fix the
3See e.g. Theorem 3 in their paper, where, for T = O(n4α) iterations, the error bound is O˜(n−α) = O˜(T−1/4).
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Table 4: Convergence guarantees for algorithms for (P2). COCO [33] is a previous algorithm and
SPADE+ is an adaptation of SPADE [34] to constrained problems. Algorithms apply either to a
general convex model class Θ or to a restricted subset for which the surrogates evaluate to values
within the domain of φj ’s; require access to a cost-sensitive oracle or not; output a stochastic classifier
µ¯ or a deterministic classifier θ¯. We denote g(µ¯) = Eθ∼µ¯ [g(θ)] and ω ∈ (0, 1/2). COCO requires
φj ’s to be smooth. The bounds are on the optimality gap and on the maximum constraint violation.
Alg. Restr. Θ? Oracle? Opt. Gap Opt. Bound Max. Viol.
COCO 7 3 g(µ¯) − min
θ∈Θ
φj(R(θ))≤0, ∀j
g(θ) O˜
(√
1
T
)
+ ρ O˜
(√
1
T
)
+ ρ
SPADE+ 3 7 g(θ¯) − min
θ∈Θ
φj(R˜(θ))≤0, ∀j
g(θ) O˜
(√
1
T
)
O˜
(√
1
T
)
Alg. 1 7 3 g(µ¯) − min
µ∈∆Θ
φj(R(µ))≤0,∀j
g(µ) O˜
(√
1
T + ρ
)
O˜
(√
1
T + ρ
)
Alg. 2 7 7 g(µ¯) − min
θ∈Θ˜
φj(R˜(θ))≤0, ∀j
g(θ) O˜
(
1
T 1/2−ω
)
O˜
(
1
Tω
)
radius κ of the space of Lagrange multipliers Λ to a constant, and instead set it to a function of T .
The larger the radius κ, the tighter is the bound on the constraint violation, but worse is the bound
on the objective g. The choice of ω strikes a trade-off between the tightness of the two bounds.
In the case of the previous result for Algorithm 1 (see Theorem 3), we were able to obtain a
O(1/√T ) rate by making an assumption that the constraints can be satisfied with a margin γ, and
using this to set κ to a constant that depends on γ. This does not work for Algorithm 2 because of
the mismatch in objectives optimized by the θ- and λ-players.4
Remark 4 (Unanswered Question in Cotter et al.). Theorem 2 resolves an unanswered question
in Cotter et al. (2019) [8, 9] on whether having the λ- and θ-players perform OGD updates on
the true and surrogate Lagrangian respectively, would lead to convergence. Cotter et al. consider
optimization problems with linear rate constraints, formulate a non-zero-game like us, and consider
two algorithms, one where both the θ- and λ-player seek to minimize external regret (through OGD
updates), and the other where the θ-player optimizes alone minimizes external regret, while the
λ-player minimizes swap regret. They are however able to show convergence guarantees only for the
the swap regret algorithm, which arguably has a more complicated set of updates (requiring computing
eigen vectors), and leave the analysis of the external regret algorithm unanswered. Theorem 4 provides
convergence guarantees for a generalization of their external regret algorithm.5
In their paper, Cotter et al. obtain a better O(1/√T ) convergence rate for their swap regret
algorithm. It is easy to show a similar convergence rate for an adaptation of this algorithm to our
setting (see Appendix E), but we stick to our present algorithm because of its simplicity.
4Theorem 3 and 4 assume that the sequence of Lagrangian objectives have bounded gradients. This may not
hold in one particular scenario: if at an iteration t, λtj = 0,∀j ∈ [J ] and λtk > 0 for some k ∈ [J +K], then the best
response ξt is unbounded, and this would result in the gradients of L being unbounded. An easy fix to this problem is
to define the set of allowable Lagrange multipliers Λ to contain vectors for which the first J coordinates are greater
than or equal to a small constant. Our convergence results would still apply under an additional assumption that no
unconstrained minimizer of g satisfies all the constraints in (P2).
5Note that our approach can be easily applied to linear rate constraints by formulating the Lagrangian in (7)
without the additional slack variables.
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Remark 5 (Relationship to previous algorithms for (P2)). A previous oracle-based approach
for solving (P2) is COCO [33], which extends the Frank-Wolfe approach for the unconstrained rate
metrics [35] with an outer gradient ascent solver, but does not directly fit into our three-player
framework. As seen in Table 4, this method enjoys similar convergence guarantees as Algorithm 1,
but requires an additional smoothness assumption on φj’s and a more complicated set of updates.
Another previous approach that can be adapted to solve (P2) is the SPADE algorithm, originally
proposed for unconstrained problems [34] (see Table 2 and 3), where the θ- and λ-players perform
OGD updates on surrogate objectives, and the ξ-player plays best response. We call this adaptation
of SPADE as SPADE+ and present its convergence guarantee in Table 4 (with further details in
Appendix C). As with existing surrogate-based methods, SPADE+ requires that the surrogate rates do
not evaluate to values outside the domain of φj’s. Algorithm 2 does not have this restriction.
Shrinking. The final stochastic classifier in all our theoretical results is defined by a uniform
distribution over T deterministic classifiers. The large support size may make this stochastic classifier
undesirable in practice. In our experiments, we post-process the iterates of our algorithms to
construct a sparse stochastic classifier over only J + 1 iterates (where recall J is the number of
constraints in (P2)). Specifically, we adopt the shrinking procedure of Cotter et al. (2019) [9] and
solve the following linear program over the T -dimensional simplex:
min
µ∈RT+,
∑T
t=1 µt=1
T∑
t=1
µt g(θ
t) s.t.
T∑
t=1
µt φ
j(θt) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ [J ]. (9)
We then use the optimal weighting µ∗ for this problem to construct the final stochastic classifier. Since
(9) is a linear optimization over the simplex with J linear constraints, the solution µ∗ can be shown to
have at most J+1 non-zero entries [9]. Further, by convexity of φj ’s, this solution is also feasible for our
original constrained problem (P2), i.e.
∑T
t=1 µ
∗
t φ
j
(
R(θt)
) ≤ 0 ⇒ φj (Eθ∼µ∗ [R(θ)]) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ [J ].
Thus the final stochastic classifier constructed from (9) is both sparse and feasible, and as we shall
see in our experiments, is often a better solution than a uniform distribution over all T iterates.
4.2 Case of Sum-of-ratios φ
Moving beyond convex functions of rates, we present heuristic surrogate-based algorithms for handling
constraints that involve summation of fractional-linear functions of rates. For simplicity, we explain
our approach with a single constraint and with a general objective:
min
θ∈Θ
g(θ) s.t.
M∑
m=1
α>mR(θ)
β>mR(θ)
≤ γ, (P3)
where αm ∈ RK+ and βm ∈ RK+ . We will assume that the numerators and denominators in each ratio
term is bounded, i.e. a ≤ α>mR(θ) ≤ β>mR(θ) ≤ b, ∀θ ∈ Θ for some a, b > 0. We use our framework
to provide two algorithms.
Slack-ratios optimizer. Our first approach introduces slack variables a1, . . . , am and b1, . . . , bm
for the numerators and denominators respectively to decouple the rates from the ratio terms:
min
θ∈Θ, a,b∈[a,b]M
g(θ) s.t.
M∑
m=1
am
bm
≤ γ, am ≥ α>mR(θ), bm ≤ β>mR(θ). (10)
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Algorithm 3 Slack-ratios Optimizer
Initialize: a0, b0, θ0, λ0
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
at+1 := ΠC
(
at − ηa∇a Lsr(θt,at,bt;λt)
)
bt+1 := ΠC
(
bt − ηb∇b Lsr(θt,at,bt;λt)
)
θt+1 := ΠΘ(θ
t − ηθ∇θ L˜sr(θt;at,bt λt))
λt+1 := ΠΛ
(
λt + ηλ∇λ Lsr(θt,at,bt; λt)
)
end for
return θ1, . . . , θT
Algorithm 4 Biconvex Optimizer
Initialize: θ0,u0, λ0
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
ξtm :=
(
utm λ
t
0 / λ
t
m
)2
, ∀m ∈ [M ]
θt+1 := ΠΘ(θ
t − ηθ∇θ L˜bc(θt, ξt,ut;λt))
ut+1 := ΠU (ut − ηu∇u Lbc(θt, ξt,ut;λt))
λt+1 := ΠΛ
(
λt + ηλ∇λ Lbc(θt, ξt,ut;λt)
end for
return θ1, . . . , θT
Figure 2: Optimizers for a sum-of-ratios constraint (P3). In Algorithm 3, L˜sr(θ,a,b;λ) is the
Lagrangian function in (11) with the rates Rk(θ) replaced with surrogates R˜k(θ), C = [a, b]M and
Λ ⊆ R2M+1+ is a bounded set. In Algorithm 4, L˜bc(θ, ξ,u;λ) is the Lagrangian function in (13) with
the rates Rk(θ) replaced with surrogates R˜k(θ), U = [0,√a/b]M , and Λ ⊆ RM+1+ is a bounded set.
We then formulate the Lagrangian for the above problem with multipliers λ ∈ R2M+1+ :
Lsr(θ,a,b;λ) (11)
= g(θ) + λ0
(
M∑
m=1
am
bm
− γ
)
+
M∑
m=1
λm(α
>
mR(θ) − am) +
2M∑
m=M+1
λm(bm − β>mR(θ)),
and seek to maximize the Lagrangian over λ and minimize it over θ,a,b:
max
λ∈R2M+1+
min
θ∈Θ, a,b∈[a,b]M
Lsr(θ,a,b;λ). (12)
Because Lsr is non-convex in the slack variables a,b, strong duality may not hold, and an optimal
solution for the dual problem (12) may not be optimal for (P3). Yet, by performing OGD updates
for the λ, θ and the slack variables, with the θ-player alone optimizing the surrogate rates R˜k, we
obtain a heuristic algorithm for (P3). The details are given in Algorithm 3.
Biconvex optimizer. Our second approach poses (P3) as a biconvex optimization problem. We
adapt a trick from Pan et al. (2016) [37] to replace the constraint with equivalent expressions
that do not contain ratios. It can be verified that for any 0 < a ≤ b < 1, the ratio ab =
minu∈R {u2b− 2u
√
b− a+ 1}. Define ϕ(z, z′;u) = u2z− 2u√z′ + 1, which for a fixed u, is convex in
z and z′, and vice versa. Using auxiliary variables ξ, ξ′ ∈ [0, 1]M , we can now re-write (P3) as:
min
θ∈Θ, ξ ∈RM+
g(θ) s.t. min
u∈RM
M∑
m=1
ϕ(α>mR(θ), ξm; um) ≤ γ, ξm ≤ β>mR(θ) − α>mR(θ),
and formulate the Lagrangian for this problem with multipliers λ ∈ RM+1+ :
L(θ, ξ;λ) (13)
= g(θ) + λ0
(
min
u∈RM
M∑
m=1
ϕ(α>mR(θ), ξm; um) − γ
)
+
M∑
m=1
λm
(
ξm − β>mR(θ) + α>mR(θ)
)
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Table 5: Datasets used in our experiments.
Dataset No. of instances No. of features Protected Attribute
COMPAS 4073 31 Gender
Communities & Crime 1495 135 Race Percentage
Law School 15388 36 Race
Adult 32561 122 Gender
WikiToxicity 95692 100 Term ‘Gay’
Business 11560 36 Chain/Non-chain
= min
u∈RM
g(θ) + λ0
(
M∑
m=1
ϕ(α>mR(θ), ξm; um) − γ
)
+
M∑
m=1
λm
(
ξm − β>mR(θ) + α>mR(θ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lbc(θ,ξ,u;λ)
.
We seek to maximize Lbc over λ and minimize it over θ, ξ,u:
max
λ∈RK+
min
θ∈Θ
ξ,u∈RM
Lbc(θ, ξ,u;λ).
The biconvex structure of ϕ allows us to adapt Algorithm 2 to this problem, giving us Algorithm 4,
where we perform best response on slack variables ξ, and OGD updates on λ, θ and u, with the
θ-player alone optimizing surrogate rates R˜k.
5 Experiments
We conduct two types of experiments. In the first, we evaluate Algorithm 2 on the task of optimizing
a convex rate objective subject to linear rate constraints. We show that our approach outperforms
an existing surrogate-based approach [34], and performs often as well as an oracle-based approach
for this problem [33] (and does so without having to make an idealized oracle assumption). In the
second set of experiments, we evaluate Algorithms 3 and 4 on the task of optimizing a sum-of-ratios
objective subject to sum-of-ratios constraints, and show that they outperform known baselines.
5.1 Datasets and Setup
Datsets. We use six datasets: (1) COMPAS, where the goal is to predict recidivism with gender as
the protected attribute [4]; (2) Communities & Crime, where the goal is to predict if a community
in the US has a crime rate above the 70th percentile [16], and as in [23], we consider communities
having a black population above the 50th percentile as protected; (3) Law School, where the task
is to predict whether a law school student will pass the bar exam, with race (black or other) as
the protected attribute [42]; (4) Adult, where the task is to predict if a person’s income exceeds
50K/year, with gender as protected attribute [16]; (5) Wiki Toxicity, where the goal is to predict if a
comment posted on a Wikipedia talk page contains non-toxic/acceptable content, with the comments
containing the term ‘gay ’ considered as a protected group [11]; (6) Business Entity Resolution, a
proprietary dataset from a large internet services company, where the task is to predict whether a
pair of business descriptions refer to the same real business, with non-chain businesses treated as
protected. A summary of the datasets is provided in Table 5. Wiki Toxicity is a text dataset, and
we use an embedding [39] to convert the text to numerical features.
15
Table 6: Optimizing KL-divergence fairness metric s.t. error rate constraints. For each method, we
report two metrics: A (B), where A is the test fairness metric (lower is better) and B is the ratio of
the test error rate of the method and that of a classifier that optimizes unconstrained error rate
(lower is better). During training, we constrain B to be ≤ 1.1. Among the last 4 columns, the lowest
fairness metric is highlighted in blue, and the second-lowest is shown in light blue.
Algorithm 2
UncError PostShift SPADE+ COCO Stochastic Determ.
COMPAS 0.115 (1.00) 0.000 (1.01) 0.009 (1.03) 0.043 (1.01) 0.000 (1.03) 0.000 (1.03)
Crime 0.224 (1.00) 0.005 (1.40) 0.158 (1.11) 0.166 (0.90) 0.094 (1.11) 0.085 (1.16)
Law 0.199 (1.00) 0.001 (1.45) 0.040 (1.09) 0.043 (1.05) 0.054 (1.12) 0.056 (1.08)
Adult 0.114 (1.00) 0.000 (1.22) 0.071 (1.03) 0.011 (1.10) 0.014 (1.10) 0.014 (1.10)
Wiki 0.175 (1.00) 0.001 (1.21) 0.083 (1.18) 0.134 (1.17) 0.133 (1.09) 0.127 (1.18)
Business 0.014 (1.00) 0.003 (1.05) 0.007 (1.03) 0.004 (1.04) 0.007 (1.07) 0.007 (1.07)
Table 7: Same as Table 6, except we compare SPADE+, COCO and Algorithm 2 without the
post-processing shrinking procedure in (9) to construct the final stochastic classifier. SPADE+
outputs 1T
∑T
t=1 θ
t. COCO uses the weighting scheme in [33]. Algorithm 2 outputs Unif(θ1, . . . , θT ).
SPADE+ COCO Algorithm 2
COMPAS 0.000 (1.02) 0.000 (1.07) 0.016 (1.02)
Crime 0.157 (1.00) 0.043 (1.25) 0.116 (1.09)
Law 0.296 (1.01) 0.027 (1.13) 0.074 (1.11)
Adult 0.098 (1.01) 0.003 (1.31) 0.068 (1.08)
Wiki 0.106 (1.23) 0.010 (1.39) 0.098 (1.30)
Business 0.006 (1.03) 0.001 (1.14) 0.005 (1.08)
Implementation Details. All experiments use a linear model. We implemented Algorithms
2–4 using the open-source Tensorflow Constrained Optimization (TFCO) library6 of Cotter et al.
(2019) [8, 9]. We use hinge-based surrogates for the rates. We use Adam to perform exact gradient
updates on θ and λ and run our algorithms for a total of 5000 iterations. The datasets are split
randomly into train-validation-test sets in the ratio 4/9:2/9:1/3, except WikiToxicity where we use
the splits made available by the authors [11]. Our code will be made available online.
Hyperparameter Choices. The step-sizes for the λ- and θ-updates in the proposed algorithms
were chosen from the range {0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1.0} using the validation set. We use a heuristic provided
in Cotter et al. (2019) [9] to pick the hyperparameters that best trade-off between the fairness
objective and constraint violations. We record snapshots of the iterates of our algorithms every 10
iterations and construct both a stochastic classifier and a deterministic classifier from the iterates.
For the stochastic classifier, we apply the shrinking procedure described in Section 4.1 to the recorded
iterates (see (9)). For the deterministic classifier, we pick the single best iterate using the trade-off
heuristic provided by Cotter et al.
6https://github.com/google-research/tensorflow_constrained_optimization/
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5.2 KL-divergence Based Fairness Objective
We consider a demographic-parity fairness objective that seeks to match the proportion of positives
predicted in each group pˆG with the true proportion of positives in the data p, measured using a
KL-divergence metric:
∑
G∈{0,1}KLD(p, pˆG). Note that this is convex in pˆG. We additionally enforce
a constraint that the error rate of the model is no more than 10% higher than an unconstrained
model that optimizes error rate (UncError), i.e. ˆerr(fθ) ≤ 1.1 ˆerr(func).
We apply Algorithm 2 (adapted to include a convex rate metric as the objective) to solve this
problem. We compare it with the surrogate-based method SPADE+, an adaptation of the SPADE
method [34] to constrained problems, and the oracle-based method COCO [33]. COCO uses a
logistic regression based plug-in method to implement an approximate cost-sensitive oracle. For a
fair comparison, we apply the post-processing shrinking step to these baselines as well, i.e. we apply
(9) to the iterates of SPADE+ and COCO, and construct stochastic classifiers. We also include the
post-shift method of Hardt et al. (2016) [19] that seeks to minimize the error rate subject to zero
fairness violations. Specifically, it takes a pre-trained class probability estimation model (in our case,
logistic regression) and assigns thresholds to the groups to correct for fairness disparity [19].
We implement UncError by optimizing the hinge loss. Both UncError and the logistic regression
for COCO and PostShift are trained with 2500 iterations of Adam. COCO is run for 500 outer
iterations and 10 inner iterations. The step-size parameter for these three methods is chosen from
{0.005, 0.01, 0.05, . . . , 10.0}. SPADE+ uses Adam for both the θ and λ updates, is run for 5000
iterations, with the two step-sizes chosen from {0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1.0, 10.0}.
We evaluate all methods based on their (a) KLD fairness metric on the test set, and (b) their
constraint violation on the test set, measured by the ratio of error rate of the learned model and
that of the unconstrained model: ˆerr(fθ)/ ˆerr(func). The results are shown in Table 6.
PostShift performs the best on the fairness metric but often fairs poorly on the constraints.
SPADE+ yields significantly poorer fairness values on the Crime and Adult datasets and suffers high
constraint violation on the Wiki dataset. In contrast, the stochastic classifier trained by Algorithm 2
closely satisfies the error rate constraint on almost all datasets. Also on five datasets, the proposed
algorithm achieves the best or second-best fairness metric, doing significantly better than SPADE+
and COCO on the Crime dataset. COCO yields the best fairness metric on two datasets.
It is also worth noting that the best deterministic classifier from Algorithm 2 often has a similar
performance to the stochastic classifier that it provides. Only on two of the six datasets, Crime and
Wiki, the deterministic classifier suffers higher constraint violations than the stochastic classifier.
All three constrained optimization algorithms benefit from using the shrinking procedure to
post-process their iterates and construct the final stochastic classifier. To better analyze their
convergence behavior, we also report in Table 7, their performance without the shrinking procedure.
Specifically, for each method, we construct the final classifier as prescribed by its convergence
gurantee: for SPADE+, this a deterministic classifier given by the average model parameters:∑T
t=1 θ
t (see Theorem 8); for COCO, this is a stochastic classifier specified by the weighting scheme
provided in Narasimhan (2019) [33]; for Algorithm 2, this is a stochastic classifier specified by a
uniform distribution over all iterates (see Theorem 4).
Without the post-processing step, SPADE+ tends to overconstrain the model, and yields very
poor fairness objective on three of the six datasets. This is because of its heavy dependence on
surrogates. In contrast, even without the shrinking step, Algorithm 2 closely satisfies the constraint
on almost all datasets, while suffering a modest increase in fairness metric on four datasets. COCO
suffers a higher constraint violation on all datasets in the absence of the shrinking step.
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Table 8: Optimizing F-measure s.t. F-measure constraints. For each method, we report two metrics:
A (B), where A is the overall test F-measure (higher is better) and B is the test constraint violation:
Fmeasureptr − Fmeasureother − 0.01 (lower is better). Among the last 4 columns, the highest
F-measure objective is highlighted in blue and the lowest constraint violation is shown in bold.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm 4
UncError UncF1 Stochastic Determ. Stochastic Determ.
COMPAS 0.652 (0.14) 0.671 (0.11) 0.618 (0.04) 0.615 (0.07) 0.629 (0.06) 0.622 (0.03)
Crime 0.742 (0.07) 0.761 (0.07) 0.735 (0.06) 0.720 (0.09) 0.692 (0.12) 0.671 (0.13)
Law 0.974 (0.08) 0.975 (0.09) 0.927 (0.04) 0.973 (0.09) 0.911 (0.01) 0.974 (0.08)
Adult 0.671 (0.05) 0.687 (0.05) 0.655 (0.04) 0.678 (0.07) 0.592 (0.02) 0.591 (0.02)
Wiki 0.968 (0.19) 0.969 (0.17) 0.838 (0.05) 0.892 (0.10) 0.829 (0.02) 0.805 (0.04)
Business 0.778 (0.04) 0.783 (0.03) 0.764 (-0.04) 0.764 (-0.04) 0.762 (-0.04) 0.754 (-0.06)
5.3 F-measure Based Parity Constraints
We consider the fairness goal of training a classifier that yields at least as high a F-measure for
the protected group as it does for the rest of the population, and impose this as a constraint.
Specifically, we seek to maximize the overall F-measure subject to the constraint: Fmeasureptr ≥
Fmeasureother − 0.01. We apply Algorithms 3 and 4 (modified to include the F-measure as the
objective) and compare it with an unconstrained classifier that optimizes error rate (UncError).7 We
also include a plug-in classifier, which is a popular approach for optimizing the F-measures without
constraints (UncF1) [26, 36, 43]. We implement the plug-in approach by tuning the threshold on the
UncError classifier to yield maximum F-measure on the training set. We are not aware of any other
approach that can handle objective and constraints that are both sums of ratios of rates.
The results are shown in Table 8, where we present both the F-measure objective on the test
set achieved by different methods, and their constraint violations measured by: Fmeasureptr −
Fmeasureother − 0.01. None of the baselines are able to satisfy the constraints. While UncF1 yields
better objective than UncError, it suffers significant constraint violations. The proposed algorithms
significantly reduce the constraint violations, by trading-off for accuracy, with Algorithm 4 yielding
the least violation in most cases, and Algorithm 3 doing better on the F-measure objective.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a three-player game framework for solving learning problems where the objective
and constraints are defined by generalized rate metrics. Our template recovered many previous
algorithms and provides a modular approach for developing new improved algorithms. Specifically,
we developed a new surrogate-based algorithm that can handle objectives and constraints that are
convex functions of rates. The proposed algorithm can be applied to a wider range of metrics than
existing surrogate methods (without additional restrictions on the model space), enables a tighter
handling of constraints, and enjoys provable convergence guarantees (without assuming access to an
idealized oracle). The benefit of our method over previous surrogate-based approaches was evident
from their improved performance on many real-world fairness tasks. We also used our framework to
7To implement Algorithm 4 using the helper functions in the TF constrained optimization library, we perform a
simple change of variables: we replace λm = λ0 λ′m, and optimize over λ′m’s instead of λm’s, m = 1, . . . ,M .
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provide new heuristic methods for optimizing with sums of ratios of rates, and showed that they are
better at solving constrained training problem compared to existing baselines.
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A Preliminaries
We cover some preliminary material that will be useful in subsequent sections.
Fenchel conjugate For a convex function ψ : RK → R, the Fenchel conjugate ψ∗ : RK → R is
defined by:
ψ∗(v) = max
c∈ domψ
{
c>v − ψ(c)
}
= − min
c∈ domψ
{
ψ(c) − c>v
}
, (14)
where domψ denotes the domain of ψ. Since ψ∗(v) is a point-wise maximum of linear functions in v,
it is easy to see that ψ∗ is convex. We denote the second Fenchel conjugate of ψ by ψ∗∗, which for
any c ∈ domψ is given by:
ψ∗∗(c) = max
v ∈ domψ∗
{
c>v − ψ∗(v)
}
= − min
v ∈ domψ∗
{
ψ∗(v) − c>v
}
, (15)
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where domψ∗ is the subset of RK for which ψ∗ is defined. For example, if ψ is monotonically
non-decreasing in an argument, domψ∗ contains vectors that are non-negative in that coordinate.
For convex functions ψ, ψ∗∗(c) = ψ(c), ∀c ∈ domψ.
The subdifferential ∂ψ(c) of a convex function ψ at a point c ∈ RK is the set of all vectors
v ∈ RK such that f(c′) ≥ f(c) + v>(c′ − c), ∀c′ ∈ RK . It follows from the definition of the Fenchel
conjugate that for any c ∈ domψ,
v ∈ ∂ψ(c) ⇐⇒ ψ(c) + ψ∗(v) = v>c. (16)
This is often referred to as the Fenchel-Young equality. A straight-forward consequence of (16) is
that for any c ∈ domψ,
v∗ ∈ ∂ψ(c) ⇐⇒ v∗ ∈ argmax
v ∈ domψ∗
{
c>v − ψ∗(v)
}
. (17)
Online convex optimization Consider an online convex optimization problem with a bounded
convex set C, and a sequence of convex functions h1, h2, . . . , hT : C → R. In each round t, the learner
needs to choose a point ct ∈ C and incurs a loss ht(ct). The goal is to minimize the learner’s average
regret: RT = 1T
∑T
t=1 ht(ct) − minc∈C 1T
∑T
t=1 ht(c).
Of course, the learner could implement a best response (BR) strategy, i.e. simply output the
minimizer of ht at each step: ct ∈ argminc∈C ht(c). This trivially gives a no-regret guarantee, but
would be expensive in practice.
A more practical and simple approach to the above problem is the classical follow-the-leader
(FTL) algorithm, which simply outputs a point with the least total loss for the previous rounds:
ct+1 = FTLC(h1, . . . , ht) ∈ argminc∈C
t∑
τ=1
hτ (c).
If each ht is Lipchitz and strongly convex, then FTL enjoys the following no-regret guarantee:
RT = O
( log(T )
T
)
.
Another popular approach is online gradient descent (OGD), which performs gradient updates
based on the previously chosen point: ct+1 = ΠC (ct − ∇ht(ct)) , where ∇ht(ct) ∈ ∂ ht(ct) and ΠC
denotes the `2-projection onto C. If each ht is Lipchitz, then OGD has the following guarantee:
RT = O
(√
1
T
)
.
B Connections to Existing Algorithms for (P1)
We elaborate on the three previous algorithm listed in Table 2 and show how their updates can be
seen as special cases of our approach. We present these methods using the notations used in this
paper and re-written to handle a convex function ψ : RK+ → R that is monotonic in each argument.
We point out these approaches were not previously derived using the three-player game view-point
that we present in this paper.
SPADE: This method [34] seeks to optimize a convex function of two rates: ψ(R1(θ), R2(θ)), and
does so by replacing the rates with convex surrogates R˜1 and R˜2, and performing gradient updates
on θ and additional dual variables α, β ∈ R+:
θt+1 ← ΠΘ
(
θt − η αt∇ R˜1(θ) − ηβt∇ R˜2(θ)
)
(18)
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(αt+1, βt+1)← ΠA
(
(αt, βt) − η′(R˜1(θ), R˜2(θ)) + η′∇ψ∗(αt, βt)
)
, (19)
where A ⊆ R2+ is a bounded set that contains all gradients of ψ and η, η′ > 0. It is straight-forward
to show that the above updates can be recovered from our proposed framework by having both the
θ- and λ-players play OGD on the surrogate Lagrangian, and the ξ-player play best response.
Theorem 5. With slack variables ξ1, ξ2 ∈ R+ and Lagrange multipliers α, β ∈ R+, define L(θ, ξ;α, β) =
ψ(ξ1, ξ2) + α(R˜1(θ)− ξ1) + β(R˜2(θ) − ξ2). Starting with the same θ0, α0, β0, the following updates
generate the same iterates θt as the updates in (18) and (19):
ξt ← argmin
ξ∈R2+
L(θt, ξ;αt, βt)
θt+1 ← ΠΘ
(
θt − η∇θ L(θt, ξt;αt, βt)
)
(αt+1, βt+1)← ΠA
(
(αt, βt) − η′∇α,β L(θt, ξt;αt, βt)
)
.
The proof is straight-forward and follows from Lemma 1, which shows that a solution to the
ξ-player’s update is ξt = ∇ψ∗(αt, βt). Substituting this into the expression for the λ-player’s update
gives us the same updates as in (18) and (19).
NEMSIS: This method [21] was designed to work with nested convex functions ψ, i.e. functions
ψ that are a convex function of multiple convex functions. While these nested metrics can be easily
handled within our framework by introducing separate slack variables for each of the inner convex
functions, here we consider an application of this method to a simpler convex metric of the form
ψ(R1(θ), R2(θ)). The NEMSIS updates for this metric, assuming ψ is smooth, is given by:
θt+1 ← ΠΘ
(
θt − η αt∇ R˜1(θ) − ηβt∇ R˜2(θ)
)
(20)
(αt+1, βt+1)← argmax
(α,β)∈A
t∑
τ=1
gτ (α, β)
where gτ (α, β) := ψ∗(α, β) − αR˜1(θτ ) − βR˜2(θτ ). (21)
These updates can be recovered from our framework by having the λ-player play FTL on the
combined objective that includes the min over ξ, and having the θ-player play OGD, with both
players operating on the surrogate Lagrangian.
Theorem 6. With slack variables ξ1, ξ2 ∈ R+ and Lagrange multipliers α, β ∈ R+, define L2(θ;α, β) =
α R˜1(θ) + β R˜2(θ) and L(θ, ξ;α, β) = ψ(ξ1, ξ2) − α ξ1 − β ξ2 + L2(θ;α, β). Starting with the same
θ0, α0, β0, the following updates generate the same iterates θt as the updates in (20) and (21):
θt+1 ← ΠΘ
(
θt − η∇θ L2(θt;αt, βt)
)
(αt+1, βt+1)← FTLA
({
minξ∈R2+ L(θτ , ξ; ·, ·)
}t
τ=1
)
The proof follows in a straight-forward manner from the definition of the Fenchel conjugate of ψ:
ψ∗(α, β) = minξ1,ξ2∈R+{ψ(ξ1, ξ2) − αξ1 − βξ2}.
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F-W: The Frank-Wolfe based method of [35] was designed to optimize performance metrics
ψ(R1(θ), . . . , RK(θ)) with smooth, convex ψ. This employs the classical Frank-Wolfe algorithm
along with a cost-sensitive oracle to perform the inner linear optimization. Specifically, the algorithm
maintains iterates θt ∈ Θ and rt ∈ RK+ . Starting with r0 = R(0), it performs the following updates:
θt+1 ← argmin
θ∈Θ
K∑
k=1
vtkRk(θ), where v
t ← ∇ψ(rt) (22)
rt+1 ←
(
1− 1
t
)
rt +
1
t
R(θt+1), (23)
where the first step uses a cost-sensitive oracle. The output of this algorithm after T iterations is a
stochastic model with probability 1t
∏T
τ=t+1
(
1− 1τ
)
on θt.
These updates can be recovered from our game formulation by having the θ-player play OGD
and the λ-player play FTL on a combined objective that contains a min over ξ, with both players
operating on the true Lagrangians.
Theorem 7. With slack variables ξ ∈ RK+ and Lagrange multipliers λ ∈ RK+ , define L(θ, ξ;λ) =
ψ(ξ) +
∑K
k=1 λk(Rk(θ) − ξk) and L2(θ;λ) =
∑K
k=1 λkRk(θ). Let Λ = RK+ . Then starting with
λ0 = ∇ψ(R(0)), the following updates generate the same iterates θt as (22) and (23):
θt+1 ← argmin
θ∈Θ
L2(θ;λt) (24)
λt+1 ← FTLΛ
({
minξ∈RK+ L(θ
τ , ξ; ·)
}t
τ=1
)
(25)
Proof. The proof follows directly from a similar result in [1]. We first note that by definition of the
Fenchel conjugate of ψ:
min
ξ∈RK+
L(θ, ξ;λ) = ψ∗(λ) +
K∑
k=1
λkRk(θ).
We expand the FTL update and show that λt here plays the same role as vt in the F-W method.
λt+1 = argmax
λ∈RK+
{
tψ∗(λ) +
t∑
τ=1
K∑
k=1
λkRk(θ
τ )
}
= argmax
λ∈RK+
{
ψ∗(λ) +
K∑
k=1
λk
1
t
t∑
τ=1
Rk(θ
τ )
}
= ∇ψ
(
1
t
t∑
τ=1
Rk(θ
τ )
)
= ∇ψ(rt) = vt,
where the third equality follows from (17). With the above observation, it is clear that (22) and (24)
generate the same iterates θt.
We note that Abernethy and Wang (2017) [1] previously pointed out that the classical Frank-
Wolfe algorithm for convex optimization can be viewed as computing the equilibrium of a zero-sum
game. We directly apply their result to show a connection between the method of Narasimhan et al.
(2015)[35] and our framework.
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Algorithm 5 SPADE+ for (P2)
Initialize: θ0, λ0
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
ξt = ∇Φ∗(λtJ+1, . . . , λtJ+K), where Φ : ξ 7→
∑J
j=1 λ
t
j ξk
θt+1 ← ΠΘ(θt − ηθ∇θ L˜2(θt; λt))
λt+1 ← ΠΛ(λt + ηλ∇λ L˜(ξt, θt; λt))
end for
return θ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 θ
t
C SPADE+: An Adaptation of SPADE for (P2)
We extend the SPADE algorithm of [34], originally proposed for unconstrained optimization of
generalized rate metrics, to the constrained problem in (P2). We seek to solve following max-min
problem, where we use a convex relaxation to the Lagrangian for both the θ- and λ-player:
max
λ∈RK+
min
θ∈Θ,
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λ) + L˜2(θ;λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L˜(ξ,θ;λ)
, (26)
The procedure is outlined in Algorithm 5, where the θ- and λ-players perform OGD updates on
surrogate objectives, and the ξ-player plays best response. Since the max-min objective in (26) is
convex in θ, the algorithm returns the average of the model across all iterates. We can then show
the following convergence guarantee for Algorithm 5 under the assumption that Θ only contains
models for which each φj(R˜(θ)) is defined.
Theorem 8. Let θ¯ be the model returned by Algorithm 5. Let Θ be a bounded convex set such that
each φj(R˜(θ)) is defined for all θ ∈ Θ. Let θ∗ ∈ Θ be such that θ∗ is feasible, i.e. φj(R˜(θ∗)) ≤
0, ∀j ∈ [J ], and g(θ∗) ≤ g(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ˜ that are feasible. Suppose there exists a θ′ ∈ Θ such
that φj(R˜(θ′)) ≤ −γ, ∀j ∈ [J ], for some γ > 0. Let Bg = maxθ∈Θ g(θ). Let BΘ ≥ maxθ∈Θ ‖θ‖2,
Bθ ≥ maxt ‖∇θL˜2(θt;λt)‖2 and Bλ ≥ maxt ‖∇λL˜(ξt, θt;λt)‖2. Then setting κ = 2(L + 1)Bg/γ,
ηθ =
BΘ
Bθ
√
2T
and ηλ = κBλ
√
2T
, we have w.p. ≥ 1− δ over draws of stochastic gradients:
g(θ¯) ≤ g(θ∗) + O
(√
log(1/δ)
T
)
and φj(R˜(θ¯)) ≤ O
(√
log(1/δ)
T
)
, ∀j ∈ [J ].
The proof follows from an adaptation of the proofs for Theorems 3 and 4 (see Sections H and I).
The iterates of SPADE+ form an approximate mixed Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game in (26).
D Surrogates for KL-divergence
We now explain why it is difficult to apply previous surrogate-based methods to performance measures
such as the KL-divergence metric in Table 1 that are defined over a restricted domain, and why our
framework provides a cleaner solution for optimizing these metrics.
Difficulty with SPADE & NEMSIS. Consider the negative logarithm of the prediction rate of
a model: − log(EX(I{fθ(X) ≥ 0})). This is one of the terms in the KL-divergence metric in Table
1. Previous surrogate methods such as SPADE [34] or NEMSIS [21] optimize this metric by first
replacing the indicator function within the logarithm with a surrogate function such as the hinge-loss
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Figure 3: Left: Plot of negative logarithm as a function of rate. Right: A hinge-based concave lower
bound on the indicator function.
to obtain a convex upper bound, and then using this surrogate approximation for all updates. The
only issue with this approach is that the log is not defined for negative values, and as we shall see
below, any reasonable choice of surrogate to replace the inner indicator would produce values that
are negative.
To see this, first note that − log is convex, but non-increasing in its input. Hence to construct a
convex upper bound for the negative log-rate, we would have to replace the inner indicator with a
concave lower-bounding surrogate. However, if we insist that the surrogate needs to be both concave
and lower-bound the indicator function, then we would have to allow the surrogate to be negative
for some parts of the input space (unless the surrogate is a constant function). For example, a hinge-
based convex upper bound on the negative log metric would look like − log(EX(min{1, fθ(X)})).
But if fθ(X) takes large negative values for a large-enough portion of the input space X, the term
within the log would be negative, rendering this function ill-defined. See Figure 3 for an illustration.
The above issue points to a drawback with the SPADE and NEMSIS methods that rely heavily
on the use of surrogates for optimization. For instance, to optimize − log(EX(min{1, fθ(X)})) using
the NEMSIS method and a hinge-based surrogate [21], we would implement the following dual
update (see (21)):
αt+1 ← argmax
α∈R+
{
log(α+ )− α1
t
t∑
τ=1
EX [min{1, fθτ (X)}]
}
.
A small  > 0 is added to the log argument to avoid numerical issues. Note that if the term
EX [min{1, fθτ (X)}] is negative at any point during the course of optimization, the maximization
over α becomes unbounded, and the iterates will never converge from that point onwards.
One way NEMSIS can be applied to handle log-rates, is to strongly regularize the model to
not output large negative values. We believe that this is how the NEMSIS was previously used to
optimize the KL-divergence metric [21]. This approach may however unnecessarily restrict the space
of models we are allowed to optimize over, and may prevent us from finding good solutions.
Applying Algorithm 2 to KLD. On the other hand, Algorithm 2 offers a cleaner solution to
dealing with log-rates and performance measures based on the KL-divergence. By using original
rates (instead of surrogates) for the updates on λ, the proposed algorithm ensures that the game
play between λ and ξ never produces values that are outside the domain of ψ.
For completeness, we derive the updates for Algorithm 2 for minimizing the KL-divergence metric
between the true positive proportion p and the model’s prediction rate pˆ(θ). The optimization
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problem (with constants removed) is given by:
min
θ∈Θ
−p log(pˆ(θ)) − (1− p) log(1− pˆ(θ)).
Introducing slack variables for the terms within the log, this can be re-written as:
min
θ∈Θ, ξ∈R2+
−p log(ξ1) − (1− p) log(ξ2) s.t. ξ1 ≤ pˆ(θ), ξ2 ≤ 1− pˆ(θ). (27)
Further, formulating the Lagrangian:
L(θ, ξ;λ) = −p log(ξ1) − (1− p) log(ξ2) + λ1(ξ1 − pˆ(θ)) + λ2(ξ2 − (1− pˆ(θ))),
we seek to solve the following max-min optimization problem:
max
λ∈R2+
min
θ∈Θ, ξ∈R2+
L(θ, ξ;λ).
Notice that the optimum Lagrange multipliers λ are always non-negative.
Using a concave lower-bounding surrogate p˜+ for pˆ and a concave lower-bounding surrogate p˜−
for 1− pˆ, we have the following updates for Algorithm 2:
ξt+11 =
p
λt1 + 
; ξt+12 =
1− p
λt2 + 
θt+1 = ΠΘ
(
θt − ηθ
(
λt1∇θ [−p˜+(θt)] + λt2∇θ [−p˜−(θt)]
) )
λt+1 = ΠΛ
(
λt + ηλ
(
ξt+1 −
[
p(θt)
1− p(θt)
]))
where Λ ⊂ R+ is a bounded set and  > 0 is a very small value to avoid numerical issues. Because
λ ≥ 0, both ξ1 and ξ2 are always non-negative, ensuring that the log in (27) is always defined.
Other Metrics. As noted in Section 2.3, the above issue also arises with the G-mean metric,
where the square root is undefined for negative values, as well as fractional-linear metrics such
as the F-measure. In the case of fractional-linear metrics, one can obtain a pseudo-convex upper
bound for the metric by replacing the numerator with a convex upper-bounding surrogate and the
denominator with a concave lower-bounding surrogate; however the pseudo-convex property of the
resulting function holds only if the surrogate for the denominator evaluates to non-negative values,
which as with the KLD, poses a restriction on the model class we are allowed to use.
E Connections to Cotter et al. (2019)
Like us, Cotter et al. [8] proposed using surrogates only for one of the two players of their game,
however, unlike us, they did not prove a convergence result for such an approach, when using the
usual Lagrangian formulation. Instead, they proposed a different non-zero-sum game, which they
called the proxy-Lagrangian. In the context of (P1), we can write the proxy-Lagrangian of (2) as:
Lθ,ξ (θ, ξ;λ) =λ1ψ (ξ1, . . . , ξK) +
K∑
k=1
λk+1
(
R˜K(θ)− ξk
)
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Lλ (θ, ξ;λ) =
K∑
k=1
λk+1 (RK(θ)− ξk)
where λ ∈ ∆K−1 ⊆ RK is the (K − 1)-probability-simplex—notice that, unlike for the Lagrangian
formulation, a multiplier λ1 is associated with the objective, in addition to theK multipliers associated
with the constraints. A similar variant could be easily given for (P2). The only difference from their
presentation is that we have grouped θ and ξ together as the parameters of the first player. Cotter
et al. [8]’s proposed approach to such a problem is to minimize Lθ,ξ over θ and ξ using an external
regret minimizing algorithm (e.g. OGD), and to maximize Lλ over λ using a swap regret minimizing
algorithm. They go on to prove a O(1/√T ) convergence rate.
This discussion shows that our proposed approach can be plugged-in to theirs straightforwardly.
The resulting algorithm is more complicated (due to the use of swap regret), but the convergence
guarantee has a better T -dependence. Unfortunately, since they do not use the Lagrangian formula-
tion, and their λ-player minimizes swap regret, it’s difficult to see how analytically optimizing over
ξ, as we do in Algorithms 1 and 2, could be incorporated into their approach.
F Proof of Theorem 1
All our proofs are for the case where the domain of ψ is RK+ . This covers all the metrics considered
in this paper, including the log-rate.
We first state a lemma that relates the Lagrangian L with the Fenchel conjugate of ψ. In
particular, we will show that if ψ is L-Lipschitz in [0, 1]K , it suffices to set the radius of the space
of Lagrange multipliers over which we optimize L to be at most L. This will later be helpful in
choosing κ in Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3. Suppose ψ is strictly convex, monotonically non-decreasing in each argument and L-
Lipschitz w.r.t. the `∞-norm in [0, 1]K . Setting the radius of the space of Lagrange multipliers Λ to
be at most L, i.e. Λ = {λ ∈ RK+ : | ‖λ‖1 ≤ L}, we have for any µ ∈ ∆Θ:
1. λ∗ ∈ argmax
λ∈RK+
{
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ; λ)
}
⇒ λ∗ ∈ Λ
2. ψ(R(µ)) = max
λ∈Λ
{
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ; λ)
}
.
3. ∇ψ∗(λ∗) = argmin
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ; λ∗), ∀λ∗ ∈ Λ.
Proof. 1. By strong duality, we first have:
ψ(R(µ)) = max
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ; λ) (28)
Since ψ is strictly convex, it’s differentiable. From the Fenchel-Young’s equality in (16), we have:
λ∗ = ∇ψ(R(µ)) ⇐⇒ ψ(R(µ)) = −ψ∗(λ∗) +
K∑
k=1
λ∗k Rk(µ)
⇐⇒ ψ(R(µ)) = min
ξ∈RK+
{
ψ(ξ) −
K∑
k=1
λ∗k ξk
}
+
K∑
k=1
λ∗k Rk(µ)
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⇐⇒ ψ(R(µ)) = min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ; λ∗)
⇐⇒ max
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ; λ) = min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ; λ∗)
⇐⇒ λ∗ ∈ argmax
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ; λ),
where where the second step uses the definition of Fenchel dual ψ∗ (see (14)), the fourth step follows
from (28) and the last step uses monotonicity of ψ and the fact the gradients of ψ all have non-zero
entries. This shows that maximizer of minξ L(ξ, µ;λ) over λ ∈ RK+ is unique and equal to the
gradient ∇ψ(R(µ)). Because ψ is L-Lipschitz w.r.t. the `∞-norm in [0, 1]K , the gradient norm
‖∇ψ(R(µ))‖1 ≤ L. Hence, the set Λ always contains a maximizer of minξ L(ξ, µ;λ) over λ ∈ RK+ .
2. For any µ:
max
λ∈Λ
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ; λ) = max
λ∈Λ
{
min
ξ∈RK+
{
ψ(ξ) −
K∑
k=1
λkξk
}
+
K∑
k=1
λk Rk(µ)
}
= max
λ∈Λ
{
−ψ∗(λ) +
K∑
k=1
λk Rk(µ)
}
= max
λ∈RK
{
−ψ∗(λ) +
K∑
k=1
λk Rk(µ)
}
= ψ∗∗(R(µ))
= ψ(R(µ)),
where in the fourth step, we have used statement 1 to replace the max of Λ with a max over RK+ ,
the fifth step uses the definition of second Fenchel conjugate (see (15)); the last step follows from
convexity of ψ.
3. By strict convexity and monotonicity of ψ, ψ∗ is defined for any λ∗ ∈ Λ and is differentiable
in Λ. We have from the Fenchel-Young’s equality in (16):
ξ∗ = ∇ψ∗(λ∗) ⇐⇒ ψ∗(λ∗) = ψ(ξ∗) −
K∑
k=1
λ∗kξ
∗
k
⇐⇒ ψ∗(λ∗) = L1(ξ∗;λ∗)
⇐⇒ ξ∗ ∈ argmin
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ; λ∗).
This completes the proof of parts 1-3.
F.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof follows directly from statement 3 of Lemma 3.
F.2 General Convergence Result
We present a convergence result for a general no-regret strategy for the λ-player, and then apply it
to the case where the player runs OGD with specific step-sizes. The iterates generated by Algorithm
1 for (P1) yield an approximate Nash equilibrium, i.e. the λ-player choosing the fixed strategy
λ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 λ
t, the ξ-player choosing the fixed strategy ξ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 ξ
t, and the θ-player choosing
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a uniform distribution µ¯ over θ1, . . . , θT , together comprise an approximate mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium of the zero-sum game in (3).
Theorem 9. Let θ1, . . . , θT , ξ1, . . . , ξT , λ1, . . . , λT be the iterates generated by Algorithm 1 for (P1).
Suppose the λ iterates satisfy the following:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − λ,
for some λ > 0. Suppose ψ is strictly convex, monotonically non-decreasing in each argument and
L-Lispchitz w.r.t. `∞ norm in [0, 1]K . Let µ¯ be a stochastic model with a probability mass of 1T on
θt. Then setting κ = L:
ψ
(
R(µ¯)
) ≤ min
µ∈∆Θ
ψ
(
R(µ)
)
+ λ + ρ.
Proof. The best-response strategies of the ξ-player and θ-players give us:
L1(ξt;λt) = min
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λt) (29)
L2(θt;λt) ≤ min
θ∈Θ
L2(θ;λt) + ρ (30)
From (29) and (30), we further get:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, θt;λt)
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
min
ξ∈RK+ ,θ∈Θ
L(ξ, θ;λt) + ρ
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
min
ξ∈RK+ ,µ∈∆Θ
L(ξ, µ;λt) + ρ (by linearity of L in µ)
≤ min
ξ∈RK+ ,µ∈∆Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξ, µ;λt) + ρ
= min
ξ∈RK+ ,µ∈∆Θ
L (ξ, µ; λ¯) + ρ (by linearity of L in λt)
≤ max
λ∈Λ
min
ξ∈RK+ ,µ∈∆Θ
L(ξ, µ;λ) + ρ
= min
µ∈∆Θ
ψ(R(µ)) + ρ, (31)
where the last step follows from statement 2 of Lemma 3 (given that the radius of the space of
Lagrange multipliers κ is set to L).
Next, from the theorem statement, the OGD updates on λ satisfy:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − λ
≥ min
ξ∈RK+
max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξ, θt;λ) − λ
30
≥ max
λ∈Λ
min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξ, θt;λ) − λ
= max
λ∈Λ
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ¯;λ) − λ
= ψ(R(µ¯)) − λ, (32)
where the last step follows from statement 2 of Lemma 3.
Combining (31) and (32), we have the desired result.
F.3 Corollary for OGD on λ
Proof of Theorem 1. We apply standard OGD convergence analysis [46] to the λ-player’s gradient
updates on λ and standard online-to-batch conversion arguments [6] (see e.g. Theorem 7 in Cotter
et al. (2019) [8]). For the sequence of losses −L(ξ1, θ1; ·), . . . ,−L(ξT , θT ; ·), with η = κ
Bλ
√
2T
in
Algorithm 1, we get the following regret bound. With probability at least 1 − δ over draws of
stochastic gradients of L:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − 2κBλ
√
1 + 16 log(1/δ)
T
.
For the above, we use the fact that the gradients∇λL(θt, ξt;λt) are unbiased, i.e.E
[∇λL(θt, ξt;λt)] ∈
∂λ L(θt, ξt;λt). Following statement 1 in Lemma 3, we set the radius of the space of Lagrange
multipliers Λ to κ = L and apply Theorem 9 to complete the proof:
ψ (R(µ¯)) ≤ min
µ∈∆Θ
ψ (R(µ)) + 2LBλ
√
1 + 16 log(1/δ)
T
+ ρ.
G Proof of Theorem 2
We first state a lemma that relates the surrogate Lagrangian with the Fenchel conjugate of ψ:
Lemma 4. Let L˜(ξ, µ;λ) = L1(ξ;λ) + L˜2(µ;λ). For any θ ∈ Θ, for which R˜(θ) ∈ domψ:
ψ(R˜(θ)) = max
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+
L˜(ξ, θ; λ).
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as statement 2 of Lemma 3.
G.1 General Convergence Result
We present a convergence result for general no-regret strategies for the θ- and λ-player that reach
an approximate coarse-correlated equilibrium, and then apply it to the case where the players run
OGD with specific step-sizes.
Theorem 10. Let θ1, . . . , θT , ξ1, . . . , ξT , λ1, . . . , λT be the iterates generated by Algorithm 2 for
(P1). Let Θ˜ =
{
θ ∈ Θ | R˜(θ) ∈ domψ}. Suppose the iterates comprise the following approximate
coarse-correlated equilibrium:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξt;λt) ≤ min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξ;λt); (33)
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1T
T∑
t=1
L˜2(θt;λt) ≤ min
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜2(θ;λt) + θ; (34)
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − λ, (35)
for some θ > 0 and λ > 0. Suppose ψ is strictly convex, monotonically non-decreasing in each
argument and L-Lispchitz w.r.t. `∞ norm. Let µ¯ be a stochastic model with a probability mass of 1T
on θt. Then setting κ = L:
ψ
(
R(µ¯)
) ≤ min
θ∈Θ˜
ψ
(
R˜(θ)
)
+ θ + λ
Proof of Theorem 10. We have:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜(ξt, θt;λt) ≤ min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξ;λt) + 1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜2(θt;λt) (from (33))
≤ min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξ;λt) + min
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜2(θ;λt) + θ (from (34))
≤ min
ξ∈RK+ ,θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜(ξ, θ;λt) + θ
= min
ξ∈RK+ , θ∈Θ
L˜(ξ, θ; λ¯) + θ (by linearity of L˜ in λt)
≤ max
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+ , θ∈Θ
L˜(ξ, θ;λ) + θ
≤ max
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+ , θ∈Θ˜
L˜(ξ, θ;λ) + θ (as Θ˜ ⊆ Θ)
= min
θ∈Θ˜
ψ(R˜(θ)) + θ, (36)
where the last step follows from Lemma 4.
Next, the OGD updates on λ satisfy:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − λ (from (35))
≥ min
ξ∈RK+
max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξ, θt;λ) − λ
≥ max
λ∈Λ
min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξ, θt;λ) − λ
= max
λ∈Λ
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ¯;λ) − λ
= ψ(R(µ¯)) − λ, (37)
where the last step follows from statement 2 in Lemma 3.
Combining (36) and (37) using the surrogate upper-bounding property, i.e. using L˜(ξt, θt;λt) ≥
L(ξt, θt;λt), gives us the desired result.
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G.2 Corollary for OGD on θ and λ
Proof of Theorem 2. We show that the iterates of Algorithm 2 form an approximate coarse-correlated
equilibrium and apply Theorem 10.
The best-response strategy of the ξ-player gives us:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξt;λt) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
min
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λt) ≤ min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξ;λt).
We then derive no-regret guarantees for the updates of the θ- and λ-player using standard convergence
analysis for OGD [46] and standard online-to-batch conversion arguments [6] (see e.g. Theorem 7 in
Cotter et al. (2019) [8]). For the sequence of losses −L(ξ1, ·; λ1), . . . ,−L(ξT , ·; λT ) optimized by the
θ-player, setting η = BΘ
Bθ
√
2T
in Algorithm 2, we get the following regret bound for the θ-player (see
Corollary 3 in [8] for the complete derivation). With probability ≥ 1− δ/2 over draws of stochastic
gradients of L˜2:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜(ξt, θt;λt) ≤ min
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜(ξt, θ;λt) + 2BΘBθ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T
.
The regret guarantee uses the fact that the gradients∇θL˜2(θt;λt) are unbiased, i.e.E
[
∇θL˜2(θt;λt)
]
∈
∂θ L˜2(θt;λt).
Similarly, for the sequence of losses −L(ξ1, θ1; ·), . . . ,−L(ξT , θT ; ·) optimized by the λ-player,
setting η = κ
Bλ
√
2T
in Algorithm 2, we get the following regret bound. With probability ≥ 1− δ/2
over draws of stochastic gradients of L:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − 2κBλ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T
.
This again uses the fact that the gradients ∇λL(θt, ξt;λt) are unbiased, i.e. E
[∇λL(θt, ξt;λt)] ∈
∂λ L(θt, ξt;λt).
Following statement 1 of Lemma 3, we set the radius of the space of Lagrange multipliers Λ to
κ = L and apply Theorem 10 to complete the proof, getting with probability ≥ 1− δ over draws of
stochastic gradients of L and L˜2:
ψ
(
R(µ¯)
) ≤ min
θ∈Θ˜
ψ
(
R˜(θ)
)
+ 2BΘBθ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T
+ 2LBλ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T
,
as desired.
H Proof of Theorem 3
The proof adapts ideas from previous results on constrained optimization and game equilibrium
[33, 9]. We will find it useful to first prove a couple of lemmas.
Lemma 5. Suppose each φj is strictly convex and monotonically non-decreasing in each argument
and g is convex. Let L be as defined in (7). Let µ∗ ∈ ∆Θ be such that µ∗ is feasible, i.e. φj(R(µ∗)) ≤
0, ∀j ∈ [J ], and Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] ≤ Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] for every µ ∈ ∆Θ that is feasible. Further, for λ ∈ RJ+K+ ,
denote a = [λ1, . . . , λJ ]> and b = [λJ+1, . . . , λJ+K ]>, and for a ∈ RJ+, let Φa(ξ) =
∑J
j=1 aj φ
j(ξ).
Then for any µ ∈ ∆Θ and a ∈ RJ+:
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1. Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] = max
λ∈RJ+K+
min
ξ∈RK+ , µ∈∆Θ
L(ξ, µ; λ).
2. ∇Φa(R(µ)) = argmax
b∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, µ; a, b)
3. ∇Φ∗a(b) = argmin
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ; b), ∀b ∈ RK+ .
Proof. 1. We re-state L from (7) for a stochastic classifier µ:
L(µ, ξ;λ) = Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] +
J∑
j=1
λj φ
j(ξ) +
K∑
k=1
λJ+k (Rk(µ) − ξk).
Since L is linear in µ(θ), convex in ξ and linear in λ, strong duality holds, and we have:
max
λ∈RJ+K+
min
ξ∈RK+ , µ∈∆Θ
L(ξ, µ; λ) = min
µ,ξ: ξ≥R(µ), φj(ξ)≤0, ∀j
Eθ∼µ [g(θ)]
= min
µ:φj(R(µ))≤0, ∀j
Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] (by monotonicity of φj ’s)
= Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] .
2–3. We note that for fixed a ∈ RJ+:
max
b∈RK+
min
ξ∈[0,1]K
L(ξ, µ; a, b) = Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] + max
b∈RK+
minξ∈RK+

J∑
j=1
aj φ
j(ξ) −
K∑
k=1
bk ξk
 +
K∑
k=1
bk Rk(µ)

= Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] + max
b∈RK+
{
min
ξ∈RK+
{
Φa(ξ) −
K∑
k=1
bk ξk
}
+
K∑
k=1
bk Rk(µ)
}
= Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] + max
b∈RK+
{
−Φ∗a(b) +
K∑
k=1
bk Rk(µ)
}
= Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] + Φ∗∗a (R(µ))
= Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] + Φa(R(µ))
The second and third parts then follow by convexity of φj ’s and the Fenchel-Young’s equality. See
statements 1 and 3 in Lemma 3 for the detailed proof steps. The third part additionally needs strict
convexity to ensure that Φ∗a(b) is defined for all b ∈ RK+ .
Lemma 6. Let φ : RK+ → R be monotonically non-decreasing in each argument and be L-Lipschitz
w.r.t. `∞ norm in [0, 1]K . Then for any µ¯ ∈ ∆Θ and ξ¯ ∈ RK+ :
φ(R(µ¯)) ≤ φ(ξ¯) + L max
k∈[K]
(Rk(µ¯) − ξ¯k)+,
where (z)+ = max{0, z}.
Proof. We first show that for any ξ,∆ ∈ RK+ , φ(ξ + ∆) − φ(ξ) ≤ Lmaxk∈[K](∆k)+, and the lemma
directly follows from this. Define ∆+k = (∆k)+ and ∆
−
k = (−∆k)+. Then
φ(ξ + ∆) − φ(ξ) = φ(ξ + ∆+ −∆−) − φ(ξ)
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= φ(ξ + ∆+ −∆−) − φ(ξ −∆−) + φ(ξ −∆−) − φ(ξ)
≤ L max
k∈[K]
|∆+k | + φ(ξ −∆−) − φ(ξ) (from the Lipchitz property of φ)
≤ L max
k∈[K]
|∆+k | + 0 (from monotonicity of φ)
= L max
k∈[K]
(∆k)+,
as desired.
H.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof follows directly from statement 3 of Lemma 5.
H.2 General Convergence Result
We present a convergence result for a general no-regret strategy for the λ-player, and then apply it
to the case where the player runs OGD with specific step-sizes. In this case, the iterates generated
by Algorithm 1 for (P2) yield an approximate Nash equilibrium, i.e. the λ-player choosing the fixed
strategy λ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 λ
t, the ξ-player choosing the fixed strategy ξ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 ξ
t, and the θ-player
choosing a uniform distribution µ¯ over θ1, . . . , θT , together form an approximate mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game in (8).
Theorem 11. Let θ1, . . . , θT , ξ1, . . . , ξT , λ1, . . . , λT be the iterates generated by Algorithm 1 for (P2)
when run with a ρ-approximate CSO oracle. Suppose the λ iterates satisfy the following:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − λ,
for some λ > 0. Suppose each φj is strictly convex, monotonically non-decreasing in each argument
and L-Lispchitz w.r.t. `∞ norm in [0, 1]K . Suppose there exists a µ′ ∈ ∆Θ such that φj(R(µ′)) ≤
−γ, ∀j ∈ [J ], for some γ > 0. Let µ¯ be a stochastic model with a probability mass of 1T on θt. Let
µ∗ ∈ ∆Θ be such that µ∗ is feasible, i.e. φj(R(µ∗)) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ [J ], and Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] ≤ Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] for
every µ ∈ ∆Θ that is feasible. Let λ∗ ∈ argmaxλ∈Λ minξ,µ L(ξ, µ;λ). Then setting κ ≥ 2‖λ∗‖1:
Eθ∼µ¯
[
g
(
θ)
] ≤ Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] + ρ + λ
and
φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ 2 (L+ 1) (ρ+ λ)/κ, ∀j ∈ [J ].
Proof. Let ξ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 ξ
t. Let λ∗ be as defined in the theorem statement.
Optimality. The best-response strategies of the ξ-player and θ-players give us:
L1(ξt;λt) = min
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λt). (38)
L2(θt;λt) ≤ min
θ∈Θ
L2(θ;λt) + ρ. (39)
From (38) and (39), we further get:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
min
ξ∈RK+
L(ξ, θt;λt)
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≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
min
ξ∈RK+ ,θ∈Θ
L(ξ, θ;λt) + ρ
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
min
ξ∈RK+ ,µ∈∆Θ
L(ξ, µ;λt) + ρ (by linearity of L in µ)
≤ min
ξ∈RK+ ,µ∈∆Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξ, µ;λt) + ρ
= min
ξ∈RK+ ,µ∈∆Θ
L (ξ, µ; λ¯) + ρ (by linearity of L in λt)
≤ max
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+ ,µ∈∆Θ
L(ξ, µ;λ) + ρ
= Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] + ρ, (40)
where the last step follows from statement 1 of Lemma 5.
Next, the OGD updates on λ satisfy for any λ′ ∈ Λ:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ′) − λ (41)
Combining (40) and (41), we have for any λ′ ∈ Λ:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ′) ≤ Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] + ρ + λ. (42)
Setting λ′ = 0 in (42) gives us:
1
T
T∑
t=1
g(θt) ≤ Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] + ρ + λ
or
Eθ∼µ¯ [g(θ)] ≤ Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] + ρ + λ.
This proves the optimality result.
Feasibility. Recall that there are two sets of constraints φj(µ) ≤ 0,∀j ∈ [J ] and Rk(µ) ≤ ξk, k ∈
[K]. We first look at the first set of constraints. Let j′ ∈ argmaxj∈[J ] φj(ξ¯). If we set λ′j′ = λ∗j′ + κ/2
and λ′j = λ
∗, ∀j 6= j′, j ∈ [J +K] in (42) (note that λ′ ∈ Λ). This gives us:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ∗) + κ
2T
T∑
t=1
φj
′
(ξt) ≤ Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] + ρ + λ.
Since L is linear in R(θ) and convex in ξ, using Jensen’s inequality, we have 1T
∑T
t=1 L(ξt, θt;λ∗) ≥
L1(ξ¯;λ∗) + L2(µ¯;λ∗) ≥ minξ,µ L(ξ, µ;λ∗) = Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] (by statement 1 of Lemma 5). Further
by convexity of φj , we have:
Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] +
κ
2
φj
′
(ξ¯) ≤ Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] + ρ + λ,
which implies:
max
j∈[J ]
φj(ξ¯) ≤ 2(ρ + λ)/κ.
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Applying Lemma 6 to each φj , we further get
max
j∈[J ]
φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ L max
k∈[K]
(Rk(µ¯) − ξ¯k)+ + 2(ρ + λ)/κ. (43)
For the second set of constraints, let k′ ∈ argmaxk∈[K](Rk(µ¯) − ξ¯k). If Rk′(µ¯) − ξ¯k′ ≤ 0, then the
feasibility condition is already satisfied. Otherwise, set λ′J+k′ = λ
∗
k′ + κ/2 and λ
′
j = λ
∗, ∀j 6= J + k′
in (42) in (42), giving us:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ∗) + κ
2T
T∑
t=1
(Rk′(θ
t) − ξtk′) ≤ Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] + ρ + λ.
Following the same steps as above:
max
k∈[K]
(Rk(µ¯) − ξ¯k) ≤ 2(ρ + λ)/κ. (44)
Substituting (44) back in (43), we have:
max
j∈[J ]
φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ 2 (L+ 1) (ρ+ λ)/κ,
as desired.
H.3 Corollary for OGD on λ
Lemma 7. Suppose each φj is monotonically non-decreasing in each argument and L-Lipschitz w.r.t.
the `∞ norm in [0, 1]K . Suppose there exists a µ′ ∈ ∆Θ such that φj(R(µ′)) ≤ −γ, ∀j ∈ [J ], for
some γ > 0. Let Bg = maxθ∈Θ g(θ). Fix µ ∈ ∆Θ. Then for any
λ∗ ∈ argmax
λ∈RJ+K+
{
min
ξ∈RK+ ,µ∈∆Θ
L(ξ, µ; λ)
}
,
the following holds: ‖λ∗‖1 ≤ (L+ 1)Bg/γ.
Proof. We separate λ∗ into a∗ = [λ∗1, . . . , λ∗J ]
> and b∗ = [λ∗J+1, . . . , λ
∗
J+K ]
>. We first bound the
norm of a∗. Let µ∗ be as defined in Lemma 5. We then have:
Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)] = min
ξ∈RK+ , µ∈∆Θ
L(ξ, µ;λ∗)
= min
ξ∈RK+ , µ∈∆Θ
Eθ∼µ [g(θ)] +
J∑
j=1
a∗j φ
j(ξ) +
K∑
k=1
b∗k (Rk(µ)− ξk)
≤ Eθ∼µ′ [g(µ)] +
J∑
j=1
a∗j φ
j(R(µ′)) (setting µ = µ′ and ξk = Rk(µ′))
≤ Bg − γ
J∑
j=1
a∗j = Bg − γ‖a∗‖1,
which gives us:
‖a∗‖1 ≤ (Bg −Eθ∼µ∗ [g(θ)])/γ ≤ Bg/γ.
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We next bound the norm of b∗. Let Φa∗ be as defined in Lemma 5. We then have from statement
2 of Lemma 5 that b∗ = ∇Φa∗(R(µ∗)). We further have:
‖b∗‖1 ≤ max
µ∈∆Θ
∥∥∥∇Φa∗(R(µ))∥∥∥
1
≤ max
ξ∈RK+
∥∥∇Φa∗(ξ)∥∥1
= max
ξ∈RK+
∥∥∥ J∑
j=1
a∗j∇φj(ξ)
∥∥∥
1
≤ max
ξ∈RK+
J∑
j=1
|a∗j |
∥∥∇φj(ξ)∥∥
1
≤
J∑
j=1
|a∗j | max
ξ∈RK+
∥∥∇φj(ξ)∥∥
1
≤ L‖a∗‖1 ≤ LBg/γ,
where in the last step, we use the Lipschitz property of φj .
Thus ‖λ∗‖1 = ‖a∗‖1 + ‖b∗‖1 ≤ (L+ 1)Bg/γ, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 3. We apply standard OGD convergence analysis [46] and online-to-batch argu-
ments [6] to the λ-player’s gradient updates on λ. For the sequence −L(ξ1, θ1; ·), . . . ,−L(ξT , θT ; ·),
with η = κ
Bλ
√
2T
in Algorithm 1, we get the following regret bound. With probability at least 1− δ
over draws of stochastic gradients of L:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − 2κBλ
√
1 + 16 log(1/δ)
T
.
Following Lemma 7, we set the radius of the space of Lagrange multipliers Λ to κ = 2(L+ 1)Bg/γ
and apply Theorem 9 to complete the proof:
Eθ∼µ¯ [g(θ)] ≤ g(θ∗) + ρ + 4(L+ 1)BgBλ
γ
√
1 + 16 log(1/δ)
T
.
and
max
j∈[J ]
φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ γρ
Bg
+ 4(L+ 1)Bλ
√
1 + 16 log(1/δ)
T
.
I Proof of Theorem 4
The proof adapts ideas from previous results on constrained optimization and game equilibrium
[9, 2]. We will find the following lemma useful.
Lemma 8. Let L˜(ξ, µ;λ) = L1(ξ;λ) + L˜2(µ;λ). Suppose each φj is convex and monotonically
non-decreasing in its arguments and g is convex. Let Θ˜ =
{
θ ∈ Θ | R˜(θ) ∈ domφj , ∀j}. Let
θ˜∗ ∈ Θ˜ be such that φj(R˜(θ˜∗)) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ [J ] and g(θ˜∗) ≤ g(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ˜ that satisfies the same
constraints. Then
max
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+ ,θ∈Θ
L˜(ξ, θ; λ) ≤ g(θ˜∗)
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Proof. Since L˜ is linear in µ(θ), convex in ξ and linear in λ, strong duality holds and we have:
max
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+ ,θ∈Θ
L˜(ξ, µ; λ) = min
θ∈Θ, ξ | R˜(θ)≤ξ, φj(ξ)≤0,∀j
g(θ)
≤ min
θ∈Θ˜, ξ | R˜(θ)≤ξ, φj(ξ)≤0,∀j
g(θ) (from Θ˜ ⊆ Θ)
= min
θ∈Θ˜ | φj(R˜(θ))≤0, ∀j
g(θ),
where the last step follows from monotonicity of each φj .
I.1 General Convergence Result
We present a convergence result for general no-regret strategies for the θ- and λ-player that find an
approximate coarse-correlated equilibrium, and then specialize it to the case where the players run
OGD with specific step-sizes.
Theorem 12. Let θ1, . . . , θT , ξ1, . . . , ξT , λ1, . . . , λT be the iterates generated by Algorithm 2 for
(P2). Let Θ˜ =
{
θ ∈ Θ | R˜(θ) ∈ domφj , ∀j}. Suppose the iterates comprise an approximate
coarse-correlated equilibrium, i.e. satisfy:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξt;λt) ≤ min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξ;λt); (45)
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜2(θt;λt) ≤ min
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜2(θ;λt) + θ; (46)
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − λ, (47)
for some θ > 0 and λ > 0. Suppose each φj is strictly convex, monotonically non-decreasing in
each argument and L-Lispchitz w.r.t. `∞ norm in [0, 1]K . Let Bg = maxθ∈Θ g(θ). Let θ˜∗ ∈ Θ˜ be
such that φj(R˜(θ˜∗)) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ [J ] and g(θ˜∗) ≤ g(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ˜ that satisfies the same constraints.
Let µ¯ be a stochastic model with a probability mass of 1T on θ
t. Then:
Eθ∼µ¯
[
g
(
θ)
] ≤ g(θ˜∗) + θ + λ
and
φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ (L+ 1) (Bg + θ + λ)/κ, ∀j ∈ [J ].
Proof of Theorem 12. Let ξ¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 ξ
t.
Optimality. We have:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜(ξt, θt;λt) ≤ min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξ;λt) + 1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜2(θt;λt) (from (45))
≤ min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξ;λt) + min
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜2(θ;λt) + θ (from (46))
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≤ min
ξ∈RK+ ,θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜(ξ, θ;λt) + θ
= min
ξ∈RK+ , θ∈Θ
L˜(ξ, θ; λ¯) + θ
≤ max
λ∈RK+
min
ξ∈RK+ , θ∈Θ
L˜(ξ, θ;λ) + θ
≤ g(θ˜∗) + θ. (48)
where the last step follows from Lemma 8.
We also have from (47):
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ′) − λ. (49)
Combining (48) and (49), we have for any λ′ ∈ Λ:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ′) ≤ g(θ˜∗) + θ + λ. (50)
Setting λ′ = 0 in (50) gives us:
Eθ∼µ¯[g(θ)] ≤ g(θ˜∗) + θ + λ.
This completes the proof of optimality.
Feasibility. Recall that there are two sets of constraints φj(Rk(µ)) ≤ 0,∀j ∈ [J ] and Rk(µ) ≤
ξk, k ∈ [K] separately. We first look at the first set of constraints. Let j′ ∈ argmaxj∈[J ] φj(ξ¯) and
set λ′j′ = κ and λ
′
j = 0, ∀j 6= j′, j ∈ [J +K] in (50) (note that λ′ ∈ Λ). This gives us:
Eθ∼µ¯[g(θ)] +
κ
T
T∑
t=1
φj
′
(ξt) ≤ g(θ∗) + θ + λ.
By convexity of φj and using g(θ˜∗) ≤ Bg, we have:
φj
′
(ξ¯) ≤ (Bg − Eθ∼µ¯[g(θ)] + θ + λ)/κ ≤ (Bg + θ + λ)/κ
which implies:
max
j∈[J ]
φj(ξ¯) ≤ (Bg + θ + λ)/κ.
Applying Lemma 6 to each φj , we further get
max
j∈[J ]
φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ L max
k∈[K]
(Rk(µ¯) − ξ¯k)+ + (Bg + θ + λ)/κ. (51)
For the second set of constraints, let k′ ∈ argmaxk∈[K](Rk(µ¯) − ξ¯k). If Rk(µ¯) − ξ¯k ≤ 0, then
the feasibility result already holds. Otherwise, set λ′J+k′ = κ and λ
′
j = 0, ∀j 6= J + k′ in (50), and
following the same steps as above:
max
k∈[K]
(Rk(µ¯) − ξ¯k)+ ≤ (Bg + θ + λ)/κ. (52)
Substituting (52) back in (51), we have:
max
j∈[J ]
φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ (L+ 1) (Bg + θ + λ)/κ,
which completes the feasibility proof.
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I.2 Corollary for OGD on θ and λ
Proof of Theorem 4. We show that the iterates of Algorithm 2 form an approximate coarse-correlated
equilibrium and apply Theorem 12.
The best-response strategy of the ξ-player gives us:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξt;λt) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
min
ξ∈RK+
L1(ξ;λt) ≤ min
ξ∈RK+
1
T
T∑
t=1
L1(ξ;λt).
We then derive no-regret guarantees for the updates of the θ- and λ-player using standard
convergence analysis for OGD [46] and standard online-to-batch conversion arguments [6]. For the
sequence of losses −L(ξ1, ·; λ1), . . . ,−L(ξT , ·; λT ) optimized by the θ-player, setting η = BΘ
Bθ
√
2T
in Algorithm 2, we get the following regret bound for the θ-player (see Corollary 3 in [8] for the
complete derivation). With probability ≥ 1− δ/2 over draws of stochastic gradients of L˜1:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜(ξt, θt;λt) ≤ min
θ∈Θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L˜(ξt, θ;λt) + 2BΘBθ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T
,
Similarly, for the sequence of losses −L(ξ1, θ1; ·), . . . ,−L(ξT , θT ; ·) optimized by the λ-player, setting
η = κ
Bλ
√
2T
in Algorithm 2, we get the following regret bound. With probability ≥ 1 − δ/2 over
draws of stochastic gradients of L:
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λt) ≥ max
λ∈Λ
1
T
T∑
t=1
L(ξt, θt;λ) − 2κBλ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T
.
An application of Theorem 12 with κ = (L+ 1)Tω, for ω ∈ (0, 0.5) then gives us:
Eθ∼µ¯ [g(θ)] ≤ g(θ˜∗) + 2BΘBθ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T
+ 2(L+ 1)Bλ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T 1/2−ω
and
max
j∈[J ]
φj(R(µ¯)) ≤ Bg
Tω
+ 2BΘBθ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T 1/2+ω
+ 2(L+ 1)Bλ
√
1 + 16 log(2/δ)
T
,
which completes the proof.
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